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NOTES
Civil Rights-EEOC v. Christiansburg Garment Co.: Extension
of the Newman "Private Attorney General" Doctrine to Title VH
Litigation
The federal district courts are vested with the discretionary power to
award attorneys' fees to prevailing parties in suits under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 19641 by section 706(k) of that title. 2 By prescribing the
conditions under which a section 706(k) award is available to prevailing
Title VII defendants, the federal courts have constructed a system of
economic incentives directly affecting the methods by which the Congres-
sional policies underlying Title VII are implemented. In constructing this
system of incentives, the courts have made a series of value judgments about
which of the policies underlying Title VII should be accorded the greatest
weight. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, em-
phasizing the need to encourage private enforcement through the courts,
held in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Christiansburg Gar-
ment Co. ,' that a prevailing defendant in a Title VII suit may recover his
attorneys' fees only upon a showing that the suit was brought in bad faith.4
On February 1, 1968, Rosa C. Helm, a black employee of the Chris-
tiansburg Garment Company (Christiansburg or the Company), was laid off
from her job. In May 1968, she filed a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC or the Commission) alleging a dis-
criminatory motive for the one-month layoff. The EEOC investigated the
charge, advised Christiansburg that it had found reasonable cause to believe
a violation had occured and attempted to obtain the Company's voluntary
compliance in correcting the violation. Upon Christiansburg's refusal to
enter into a conciliation agreement with the EEOC, the Commission issued
Mrs. Helm a letter informing her of her right to bring a civil suit against the
company to compel compliance with Title VII and recover back pay. Mrs.
Helm did not exercise this right.
The EEOC filed suit in federal district court against Christiansburg on
January 25, 1974.1 The district court subsequently granted the Company
1. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970).
3. 550 F.2d 949 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 2948 (1977).
4. Id. at 952.
5. EEOC v. Christiansburg Garment Co., 376 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D. Va. 1974).
On March 24, 1972, an amendment to Title VII was passed empowering the EEOC to sue
eo nomine to secure compliance with that title. This power was "applicable with respect to
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summary judgment.' Thereafter, Christiansburg filed a petition for award of
attorneys' fees pursuant to section 706(k).7 The trial court denied the
petition on the ground that the suit represented a good faith effort by the
Commission to discharge its statutory duties.'
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit upheld the denial of the petition. 9
Writing for a two to one majority, Judge Field rejected "reasonableness" as
the appropriate standard for attorneys' fees awards to prevailing Title VII
defendants in favor of a standard of "good faith."10 Recognizing that
prevailing Title VII plaintiffs are ordinarily awarded attorney's fees, 1 the
court stressed that the public policy considerations supporting liberal awards
to plaintiffs are absent in the case of prevailing defendants. 12
The Christiansburg holding is the most recent development in fee-
shifting doctrine in public interest litigation, an area of the law that has
spawned inconsistent results and rationales in the federal courts.13 These
inconsistencies are due in large part to confusion over the limits of the
"private attorney general" doctrine espoused by the United States Supreme
Court in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc. 14 In Newman, the Court
charges pending with the Commission on the date of enactment of this Act and all charges filed
thereafter." Act of March 24, 1972, Pub.L. No. 92-261, § 14, 86 Stat. 113 (1973).
6. The trial court held that the new enforcement power was not meant to be "completely
retroactive" to the effective date of the original Act of 1964. 376 F. Supp. at 1074. Rather, it
was meant to be limited to charges on which further action remained to be taken by the EEOC
under its original mandate, the last step of which was issuance of notice of right-to-sue to the
complainant. Because the suit was brought three-and-one-half years after the right-to-sue letter
was issued to Mrs. Helm, the EEOC was without authority to prosecute the action. Id.
7. Section 706(k) provides:
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a rea-
sonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States
shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970).
8. 550 F.2d at 951. The district court opinion on the attorneys' fees issue is unreported.
The district court noted that construction of § 14, see note 5 supra, was an issue of first
impression, accord, 376 F. Supp. at 1073, and that the Commission prevailed on two of
Christiansburg's three motions for summary judgment. See 550 F.2d at 952.
9. 550 F.2d at 952.
10. If. Christiansburg urged the reasonableness standard on the court.
Ii. Id. at 951.
12. Id. In a heated dissent, Judge Widener argued: (1) There is a split in the circuits on the
standard to be applied to defendants' use of § 706(k); (2) policy decisions such as those made by
the majority are matters for Congress, not the courts; (3) the remedies available under Title VII
are so radical, and colorable claims so easy to come by, that a radically different standard for
defendants is not needed to effectuate the policy of antidiscrimination; (4) it is unfair to
defendants to impose such a strict standard, particularly in view of the political malleability of
government agencies; and (5) defendants should recover attorneys' fees when the plaintiffs'
claims, though colorable, are without merit. Id. at 952-54 (Widener, J., dissenting).
13.. See generally Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 301 (1973); Tunney, Foreward: Financing the Cost of Enforcing Legal Rights, 122 U. PA.
L. REV. 632 (1974); Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and EqualAccess to the Courts,
122 U. PA. L. REV. 636 (1974).
14. 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
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held that a prevailing plaintiff under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 196415
should be awarded attorneys' fees under that provision's fee-shifting sec-
tion16 as a matter of course, unless special circumstances would render such
an award unjust. 17 The Court noted that when a private plaintiff sues under
Title II he may obtain injunctive relief only.18 Such an injunction benefits
the public by advancing the strong Congressional policy of eliminating
discrimination. 19 Further, if aggrieved parties were forced to bear the cost of
bringing suit under Title II, very few would be financially able to invoke the
injunctive power. 20 Because Title II depends upon private plaintiffs for
enforcement, 21 Congress must have enacted the Title II fee-shifting provi-
sion not just to penalize irresponsible litigants, but to encourage individuals
injured by discrimination to seek injunctive relief.22
The federal courts of appeals, apparently reading Newman as an
expansion on the traditional, equitable power to award attorneys' fees, 23
applied the "private attorney general" rationale to a number of other federal
statutes24-among them statutes that did not contain any fee-shifting provi-
sion.25 This practice was abruptly halted by the Supreme Court in Alyeska
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society.26 In Alyeska, the Supreme
Court reversed an attorneys' fees award granted to a prevailing plaintiff
suing under the Mineral Leasing Act of 192027 and the National Environ-
mental Protection Act of 1969.28 The Court held that, absent statutory
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1970).
16. Id. § 2000a-3(b).
17. 390 U.S. at 402.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 401.
22. Id. at 402.
23. The "American rule" generally prohibits attorneys' fees awards. Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-51 (1975). Under equitable principles, two
exceptions have been fashioned to the rule. First, when the prevailing party has created or
preserved a fund for the benefit of an ascertainable class, attorneys' fees may be awarded if
that fund or the class of beneficiaries will absorb the cost of the award. Second, an award may
be made to a party who was subjected to a bad faith attack by the other party in the course of
the suit, or when the other party wilfully disobeyed a court order. Id. at 257-59.
24. The "private attorney general" rationale has also been applied in nonstatutory cases.
See, e.g., Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 953 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972)
("Newman is directly applicable" in suit to force school board to provide bus transportation to
students forced to change schools by desegregation plan); Comment, Attorney's Fees: Only
Congress Can Award Compensation to Private Attorneys General, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 1071,
1076 n.22 (listing cases).
25. See, e.g., Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836, 841 (5th Cir. 1972) (42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970));
Jinks v. May, 464 F.2d 1223, 1228 (5th Cir. 1972) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)); Lee v. Southern
Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290, 295-96 (5th Cir. 1970) (42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970)).
26. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
27. 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
28. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4361 (West. 1977).
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authority to award attorneys' fees, the traditional, equitable grounds of bad
faith or common fund are the only grounds that a court may use for fee-
shifting. 29
Criticism of the stifling effect of Alyeska on privately brought public
interest suits30 was noted in the lower federal courts. The lower courts,
prohibited by Alyeska from applying the Newman "private attorney gener-
al" theory to cases not involving fee-shifting statutes, used the doctrine to
formulate standards for invoking section 706(k) of Title VII. Specifically, a
number of courts extended the "private attorney general" theory as grounds
for allowing prevailing Title VII plaintiffs to recover attorneys' fees as a
matter of course3' and restricting awards to prevailing Title VII defendants
to those who have been sued either in bad faith, or upon unreasonable,
meritless grounds. 32
Those courts that have reached the issue are in disagreement as to
whether the standard for defendants' recovery of attorneys' fees should be
the same as that for plaintiffs in Title VII suits. 33 In United States Steel
Corporation v. United States,34 the Third Circuit explained the policies
underlying the distinction:
A prevailing defendant seeking an attorney's fee does not
appear before the court cloaked in a mantle of public interest. In
contrast to the advantage to the public that inheres in a successful
attack against discriminatory practices, as in Piggy [sic] Park, one
cannot say as a general rule that substantial public policies are
furthered by a successful defense against a charge of discrimina-
tion. Instead, a defendant seeking a counsel fee under Section
706(k) must rely on different equitable considerations.3 5
29. 421 U.S. at 271. The Court stated that "the circumstances under which attorneys' fees
are to be awarded and the range of discretion of the courts in making those awards are matters
for Congress to determine." Id. at 262.
30. E.g., The Suprente Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1, 170-82 (1975); Note,
Attorneys' Fees-Awards of Attorneys' Fees Are Not Permissible Under a Non-Statutory
Private Attorney General Doctrine, 7 TEx. TECH L. REV. 122 (1975).
31. E.g., Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Johnson v.
Georgia Hy. Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974); Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs,
Inc., 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971), 1007 (1972); Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971);
Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
32. E.g., Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1976); United States Steel Corp.
v. United States; 519 F.2d 359 (3rd Cir. 1975); Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 503 F.2d 1131
(9th Cir. 1974).
33. See cases cited notes 31-32 supra. Recently, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have held
that defendants should be subject to the same standaid as plaintiffs in pursuit of § 706(k)
awards. EEOC v. Bailey Co., 46 U.S.L.W. 2177 (6th Cir. Oct. 11, 1977); United States v.
Allegheny Ludlum Indus., Inc., 46 U.S.L.W. 2153 (5th Cir. Sept. 27, 1977).
34. 519 F.2d 359 (3rd Cir. 1975).
35. Id. at 364, quoted in EEOC v. Christiansburg Garment Co., 550 F.2d at 951.
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While distinguishing on policy grounds awards to plaintiffs and awards to
defendants, the United States Steel court failed to formulate precisely the
standard to be applied to defendants. Rather, the court used a string of
adjectives that included "bad faith, vexatious, or harassing" 36 as well as
"unfounded [or] meritless." 37
The United States Steel decision commenced a new swing in the
Newman doctrine pendulum. The Fourth Circuit decision in Chris-
tiansburg, calling for the application of the strict standard, one that requires
actual bad faith, to Title VII defendants seeking the benefit of section
706(k), marks the apex of that swing.
The Christiansburg case raised two important issues: (1) whether the
standard to be applied to prevailing Title VII defendants should be different
from that applied to prevailing Title VII plaintiffs under section 706(k); and
(2) if so, whether the standard for defendants should be the strict "good
faith" standard, or the more expansive "reasonableness" standard. 38
On its face, section 706(k) requires only that the court use its discretion
in awarding attorneys' fees and prescribes no standards by which that
discretion is to be exercised. It would appear, however, that the statute
intends to extend the equitable power of the courts to grant attorneys' fees
when bad faith is present. 39
Though there is a paucity of legislative history pertaining specifically
to section 706(k), comments from the floor of Congress concerning the
strikingly similar fee-shifting provision of Title II4 indicate that the latter
section was enacted to make it easier for poor plaintiffs to bring meritorious
suits41 while at the same time discouraging frivolous ones. 42 Congress
The court also stated that "[a] routine allowance of attorney fees to successful defendants
• . . might effectively discourage suits in all but the clearest cases, and inhibit earnest advocacy
on undecided issues." 519 F.2d at 364-65.
36. 519 F.2d at 364.
37. Id. at 363 (quoting the trial court finding, 385 F. Supp. 346, 349 (W.D. Pa. 1974), with
approval).
38. See text accompanying note 10 supra. It should be patently unreasonable to abuse the
judicial system in an attempt to harass, embarrass or otherwise act in bad faith. The "bad faith"
category is contained, therefore, in the "unreasonableness" category.
39. One writer has noted that "since the traditional policy is so ingrained and widely
known, the statute can only be regarded as a deliberate departure [therefrom]." Walker, Title
VII: Complaint and Enforcement Procedures andRelief andRemedies, 7 B.C. INDUS. AND COM.
L. REV. 495, 506 (1966).
40. The section provides: "In any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter, the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the United States shall be liable for costs the
same as a private person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970).
41. Senator Humphrey, arguing in favor of the section as floor manager of the Act, said,
"This should make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a meritorious suit." 110
CONG. REC. 12724 (1964).
42. Senator Pastore remarked that the provision's purpose was to force a prospective Title
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apparently assumed that the application of the provision to plaintiffs and
defendants would not be uniform. Plaintiffs were to be encouraged to bring
suit under Title HI by a liberal fee-shifting policy; awards to defendants were
intended only to deter the institution of groundless suits. The difference in
the policy goals of the two awards implies a difference in the standards
regulating their invocation.
Any analogy between Title II and Title VII, however, must be drawn
with care. Fundamental differences in the remedy provisions and enforce-
ment mechanisms of the two titles caution against its unqualified adoption. 43
As the Supreme Court noted in Newman, compensatory damages are not
available under Title II.1 The Title II plaintiff could thus be appropriately
characterized as a "private attorney general" 45 because the injunctive relief
he sought would not benefit him except as an incident to his membership in
the aggrieved minority group. A Title VII plaintiff, however, may sue not
only for injunctive relief but also for monetary relief in the form of up to two
years' back pay. 46 A privately initiated Title VII suit is not, therefore, as
clearly called "private in form only." '47 From the Title VII plaintiff's
viewpoint, the prospect of "make-whole relief" can act as an incentive
offsetting the danger that, should he lose, an award of attorneys' fees would
be made to the defendant. The Title LI plaintiff, denied this prospect of
monetary relief, would be more heavily burdened financially by a liberal
policy of awarding attorneys' fees to Title II defendants. 48
Moreover, Title II relies primarily upon privately brought suits for
enforcement. 49 Title VII, by contrast, was originally concerned primarily
II plaintiff to "make certain that he is not on frivolous ground." Id. at 14214; see United States
Steel Corp. v. United States, 385 F. Supp. 346 (W. D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 359 (3d Cir.
1975).
43. See Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86, 90-91 (4th Cir. 1971) (Boreman, J.,
dissenting).
44. 390 U.S. at 402.
45. Id. The Court characterized privately brought Title II suits as "private in form only."
Id. at 401.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975). Additionally, the court is empowered to
fashion "any other equitable relief [it] deems appropriate." Id. The Supreme Court has stated
that the court should attempt to recreate those conditions that would have obtained had there
been no discrimination. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
47. 390 U.S. at 401.
48. In Fort v. White, 530 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1976), the court refused to apply the Newman
doctrine as grounds for allowing fee awards to Title VIII (fair housing) plaintiffs as a matter of
course. The court stated that "[42 U.S.C.] § 3612(c) [(Supp. V 1975)]. . .expressly provides
for actual as well as punitive damages. . . so that the successful litigant in the usual case will
be able to pay his counsel fees out of damages." Id. at 1118. The court in Carrion v. Yeshiva
Univ., 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1976), distinguished Fort v. White on the erroneous assumption
that Title VII provides only for injunctive relief. Id. at 727 n.7.
49. The Attorney General may sue in cases where a "pattern or practice" of discrimina-
[Vol. 56
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with securing voluntary compliance in ending discrimination through the
efforts of the EEOC,50 which was granted broad powers to investigate
charges filed with it.51 In addition, in 1972, the EEOC was further em-
powered to bring suit eo nomine to enforce Title VII. 52 It cannot be said,
therefore, that the need for private enforcement of Title VII approaches in
magnitude the need for private enforcement of Title H.13
These distinctions do not, however, go to the essential justification for
differentiating between plaintiffs' and defendants' invocation of section
706(k). When a private plaintiff brings suit under Title VII, he confers a
substantial and judicially cognizable benefit on the public in furthering the
strong Congressional policy of ending employment discrimination. 54 Furth-
er, allowing prevailing Title VII defendants to recover attorneys' fees as a
matter of course would severely impair the right conferred upon aggrieved
employees by Congress in 196455 and expressly preserved in 197256 to bring
suit to vindicate their civil rights. Prospective Title VII plaintiffs would be
deterred from fully litigating complex or novel issues by the prospect of
being forced to absorb the full cost of their resolution.57 Attorneys would be
discouraged from representing Title VII plaintiffs by the increased likeli-
hood that their clients, after paying a prevailing defendant's attorneys' fees,
would be unable to pay their own counsel fees. 58
tion is alleged, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5(a) (1970), and may intervene in suits of "general public
importance." Id. § 2000a-3(a).
50. Representative Lindsay, a member of the House Judiciary Committee when the Act
was being considered there, explained that under Title VII "unless this voluntary procedure is
complied with nothing further can happen." 110 CONG. REc. 2565 (1964); cf. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973) (EEOC right-to-sue letter prerequisite to
complainants' cause of action). The bill would originally have allowed the civil action in
advance of conciliation efforts, but that provision was stricken to make certain that conciliatory
efforts were attempted first. See 110 CONG. REC. 2566, 2576 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler,
Chairman of the House Judiciary Comm.). But see Walker, supra note 39: "The system of
individual enforcement was the result of a conscious, explicit rejection of a system of adminis-
trative enforcement, and liberal awards of attorney's fees to successful complainants are
necessary if the system is to work as intended." Id. at 506 (footnotes omitted).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (Supp. V 1975).
52. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see note 5 supra.
53. Furthermore, the EEOC provides the complainant with many services, such as inves-
tigation and negotiation of settlement, which would have to be performed by a Title II plaintiff's
attorney. Lea v. Cone Mills Corp. 438 F.2d 86, 90 (4th Cir. 1971) (Boreman, J., dissenting).
54. See cases listed at notes 31-32 supra.
55. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(f)(1), 78 Stat. 260-61 (1964).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(i) (Supp. V 1975).
57. See Nussbaum, supra note 13, at 305-06; cf. 110 CONG. REc. 6541 (1964) (remarks of
Senator Humphrey concerning the prohibitive costs of litigating a civil rights suit).
58. See Nussbaum, supra note 13, at 309. The deterring effect on attorneys would not be
lessened by the present liberal policy of appointing counsel for plaintiffs and authorizing the
commencement of the action without pre-payment of fees, costs or security pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975). Cf. Harris v. Walgreen's Distribution Center, 456 F.2d
588 (6th Cir. 1972) (would be abuse of discretion to refuse plaintiff's request of appointment of
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
To be party-blind in awarding attorneys' fees under section 706(k)
would be to ignore the financial advantage ordinarily enjoyed by a Title VII
defendant because of its ability to spread the costs of litigation through an
increase in union dues59 or the cost of its product. Adequate representation
and litigation of important issues would be hampered by economic dispari-
ty;6° the traditional goals of fee-shifting61-fair allocation of litigation costs
and the strengthening of legal rights through increased access to judicial
remedies-would be obscured.
Finally, Congress enacted the EEOC enforcement powers provision of
the 1972 Act in an effort to curb abuse of the persuasion-conference-
conciliation approach of Title VII by employers who, realizing that the
litigation burdens shouldered by Title VII plaintiffs made private enforce-
ment unlikely, found resistance economically preferable to negotiated com-
pliance.62 Liberal application of section 706(k) to defendants would threaten
the return of such abuse as private plaintiffs would be even more strongly
deterred by the financial risks and burdens of Title VII litigation. The same
level of deterrence presumably would not apply to the EEOC because of its
deeper pocket. However, the effectiveness of a threatened EEOC suit as an
encouragement to conciliation would be weakened if the employer could
expect to recover his attorneys' fees in any suit he won.
Recognizing the need for preserving adequate incentives for private
enforcement of Title VII, the Christiansburg court approved the basic
distinction drawn in United States Steel between plaintiff and defendant
attorneys' fees awards.6 3 The court went further, however, eliminating the
good faith-reasonableness ambiguity present in the United States Steel
standard. Judge Field's opinion extended the "private attorney general"
rationale to justify adoption of the strict "good faith" standard and, in so
holding, gave Newman the broadest reading it has received since Alyeska.
The Christiansburg court rested its decision solely on policy grounds.
It did not purport to derive its holding from the legislative history of the Title
counsel solely because the EEOC had found no reasonable cause to believe a violation had
occurred). Plaintiff would still owe the appointed attorney after the suit was over. Legal aid
services, already over-burdened, would not be in a position to absorb an increased caseload due
to unwillingness of the private bar to risk Title VII litigation. See Clark, Legal Services
Programs-The Caseload Problem, or How to Avoid Becoming the New Welfare Department,
47 J. URB. L. 797 (1970). "[TJhe most serious national legal problem of the poor is the over-
extended caseload in legal services programs." Id. at 798.
59. Title VII applies to labor unions by virtue of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(e) (Supp. V 1975),
60. See Tunney, supra note 13.
61. See Comment, supra note 13.
62. See S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1971).
63. 550 F.2d at 951.
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II fee-shifting provision. 64 Nor did it undertake any textual analysis to
support the rejection of the objective "reasonableness" standard.65
Courts have traditionally had the equitable power to award attorneys'
fees to a prevailing defendant who was sued in bad faith. The limit imposed
by Christiansburg on defendants' use of section 706(k) does not, therefore,
increase their opportunity to recover attorneys' fees against private plaintiffs
beyond that available at common law. 66 In effect, the court construed the
word "party" in section 706(k) to mean "plaintiff" and thereby read
prevailing defendants out of the statute.
The propriety of this interpretation of section 706(k) cannot be deter-
mined without considering the entirety of Title VII. In exercising the
discretionary, remedial power under section 706(k), the courts should seek
to further the substantive policies of the Act. The Christiansburg majority,
while resting adoption of the strict standard on the need to further the
policies of Title VII and an asserted lack of support for defendant awards
discernible therefrom, failed to consider the legislative goals in detail.
The primary purpose of Title VII has been described as prophylactic,
one of deterring discrimination.67 By prescribing in the original and amend-
ing acts the methods by which Title VII claims should be handled, Congress
devised a scheme of enforcement calculated to provide the maximum deter-
ring effect on unfair labor practices, while ensuring full, fair and efficient
resolution of individual claims.
The EEOC was vested with no enforcement powers under the original
version of Title VII, 68 although it was empowered to conduct a full investi-
gation of filed claims. 69 If the Commission found reasonable cause to
believe a violation of Title VII had occurred, it resorted to informal methods
64. The comments on the Congressional floor concerning that provision fail to differ-
entiate between the objective and subjective standards, see, e.g., notes 41-42 supra, and
therefore cannot support the rejection of either.
65. There is no consensus among the federal district courts on which standard is appropri-
ate. Compare Robinson v. KMOX-TV, 407 F. Supp. 1272 (E.D. Mo. 1975), with EEOC v.
Western Elec. Co., 10 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 1275 (D. Md. 1975), and Lee v. Chesapeake &
Ohio Ry., 389 F. Supp. 84 (D. Md. 1975). See generally Note, Recovery by Prevailing Defend-
ants in Title VII Actions, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627 (1977). None of these cases rely on
Newman in reaching its result.
66. See note 23 supra. The section does carve out an exception to the prohibition of 28
U.S.C. § 2412 (Supp. V 1975) against attorneys' fees awards against the federal government.
Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 503 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974). But this can hardly be the sole
effect that Congress intended § 706(k) to have on defendants' fee awards in view of the use of
the word "party" in the section.
67. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975).
68. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 259 (1965) (no provision for
EEOC pursuit of legal remedies); notes 5 & 6 supra.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975).
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of conference, persuasion and conciliation in an effort to obtain voluntary
compliance. 70 Judicial recourse was available only to the complainant, who
was given statutory standing to sue for injunctive and compensatory relief. 71
This voluntary approach proved inadequate, 72 provoking the Ninety-
first Congress to authorize the EEOC to bring suit to compel compliance
with the title.73 The fact that Congress, upon discerning the inadequacies of
the 1964 Act, did not provide further incentives for private enforcement, but
instead enlarged the powers of the Commission, strongly suggests that the
EEOC was to continue to play the primary role in administering Title VII.
74
The Fourth Circuit's adoption of the strict standard in Christiansburg
encourages Title VII litigation by the EEOC as well as by private plaintiffs.
But the incentive to the EEOC must be presumed to be the lesser of the
effects because its ability to satisfy adverse section 706(k) awards can be
enhanced by Congress if the need arises. Conversely, the impetus to private
litigation is substantially greater. Thus, the Christiansburg court has effect-
ed a shift in the enforcement shares of complainants and the EEOC from that
chosen by Congress.
The Christiansburg court's invocation of the good faith standard is
premised on the need for further incentives to private enforcement of Title
VII. More fundamentally, the decision reflects a policy judgment that an
increase in privately brought Title VII suits, to be achieved by minimizing
the risk of double attorney costs to plaintiffs, will further the Congressional
goal of eliminating discrimination; in other words, it assumes that further
incentive to private plaintiffs is advisable as a method of furthering the
policies of Title VII.
It is likely that more instances of employment discrimination will be
remedied judicially by application of the strict standard, but the practical
effect of the findings and conciliation efforts of the EEOC, achieved through
expensive and time-consuming investigative and conference procedures,
may be diminished. Aggrieved persons are not precluded from bringing
Title VII actions by an EEOC finding of no reasonable cause. 75 The more
incentive a complainant has to sue, the more likely it is that he will disregard
70. Id.
71. Id. § 2000e-5(g).
72. The House Labor Committee observed: "[T]he Commission has been able to achieve
successful conciliation in less than half the cases in which reasonable cause was determined. It
has been the emphasis on voluntariness that has proven to be most detrimental to the successful
operation of Title VII." H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1971).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (Supp. V 1975).
74. See note 77 and accompanying text infra.
75. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.,
444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971), 1007 (1972).
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such a finding. Similarly, a complainant dissatisfied with a conciliation
agreement between the EEOC and the alleged offender may bring suit under
Title VII for judicial resolution of his claim.76 With greater incentive, a
complainant is more likely to find such an agreement unsatisfactory. Conse-
quently, an employer or union may find that its efforts to cooperate with the
EEOC investigation and negotiate a settlement are to a substantial degree
wasted.77
In considering the role the EEOC was to assume in enforcing Title VII,
Congress was not concerned solely with finding the most efficient means of
resolving employment disputes. Substantial concern was voiced in commit-
tee that the extra-judicial procedures of the EEOC do not adequately protect
the rights of the parties. 78 Some provision for access to the courts was
deemed necessary to provide the due process safeguards of a full adversary
proceeding and to afford the courts a measure of supervision over the
EEOC's findings and activities. 79
Promotion of the policies of Title VII, then, requires an allocation of
enforcement burdens between private plaintiffs and the EEOC that, while
effecting efficient claim disposition, preserves the due process safeguards
and judicial control necessary to assure full and fair claim adjudication. The
Christiansburg opinion offers no guidance as to why further encouragement
to private plaintiffs is needed or advisable to effect a proper allocation of
enforcement burdens. But in applying the strict "good faith" standard to
prevailing defendants because the policies of Title VII were assertedly
furthered thereby, 80 it implicitly made such a judgment.
The Christiansburg court could be viewed as having relied solely on
the absence of equitable or policy considerations supporting section 706(k)
awards to defendants. If the court did so, however, it did so without
comment. While stating that a prevailing defendant seeking to use section
706(k) must rely on "different equitable considerations,"'" it neglected to
76. Williams v. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. La. 1972).
77. The Senate Labor Committee permitted individuals to seek judicial remedies when the
Commission has not reached a satisfactory resolution of their claims, but it expected that
"recourse to this remedy will be the exception, and not the rule." S. REP. No. 415, supra note
62, at 23. One writer noted that § 706(k) was designed to encourage voluntary compliance with
the EEOC requirements. Vass, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV.
431, 453-54 (1966).
78. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. 13,40 (1964); H.R. REP. No. 914, Pt.
2, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1963).
79. See Williams v. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 613, 617 (E.D. La. 1972). See
also General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
80. 550 F.2d at 951-52.
81. Id. at 951 (quoting United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d at 364).
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discuss what those considerations might be. 82 In so doing, the court may
have overlooked some valid arguments for awards to defendants.
When an employer or union has defended against a suit unreasonably
brought, that party has often vindicated one of the primary legislative goals
of Title VII, the alleviation of "economic waste that is caused by denial of
job opportunities., 83 By preserving a legitimate employment practice the
defendant has increased the set of court-approved devices that employers
may use to obtain optimum production levels. Fairness and public policy
would appear to dictate that such a defendant be made whole for his
expenses in clearing the way for unhindered public use of the unreasonably
challenged prerogative. 84
Moreover, an employer who is over-deterred from defending legitimate
labor practices may avoid instituting many of those practices at the outset.
An alleged offender called to the EEOC conference table finds itself in an
inferior bargaining position because, should it fail to reach a conciliation
agreement, it faces an expensive lawsuit with virtually no chance of recover-
ing its expenses under section 706(k). Should the suit be brought by the
complainant, the defendant, should he lose, has certain double-expense to
fear. As a result, practices that were never considered by Congress to be
violative of Title VII may be abandoned without contest. A prudent employ-
er, confronted with the substantial financial risks of defending his labor
practices, may conform his labor practices, not to the construction of Title
VII rendered by the courts, but to a reading of the title that avoids these
threshold risks.
The effects of over-deterring a Title VII defendant otherwise disposed
to defend its practice operate not only to limit the set of court-approved
management prerogatives, but also to expand informally the scope of Title
VII prohibitions. Adoption of the strict standard, to the extent that it
precipitates abstention from labor practices not prohibited by Title VII as
intended or construed, impairs the integrity of the Act and is therefore
counter-productive.
Failure to consider this and other policies and equities detracts from the
persuasive force of the Christiansburg reasoning. However, the analogy
drawn from the legislative history of the fee-shifting provision of Title II and
the Congressional policies of providing aggrieved employees access to the
82. Presumably, the court considered defendants' possible equities to be limited to the
traditional punitive purpose of awards when the suit was brought in bad faith. See Hall v. Cole,
412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973).
83. 110 CONG. REC. 1639 (1964) (remarks of Mr. Lindsay).
84. "[M]anagement prerogatives, and union freedoms are to be left undisturbed to the
greatest extent possible." H.R. REP. No. 914, supra note 78, at 29.
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courts, deterring discrimination and preventing abuse of Title VII proce-
dures, support the Fourth Circuit conclusion that a stricter standard be
applied to defendants seeking the benefit of section 706(k) than to plaintiffs.
The weaknesses in the Title II analogy do not militate against the imposition
of different standards. Rather, they demonstrate that the magnitude of that
difference should be discerned from the policies underlying Title VII, not
Title ]I.85 More generally, they highlight the need for a limit on the
extension of the "private attorney general" (Newman) doctrine to Title VII
issues.
The Christiansburg decision, in its failure to recognize such a limit, is
not supportable by precedent or legislative history and distorts the plain
meaning and import of section 706(k). The extension of the Newman
doctrine to justify applying the strict "good faith" standard is dissonant
with the scheme of enforcement of Title VII and the correlative enforcement
responsibilities of EEOC and private complainants. Ignoring the warning
voiced in Alyeska by the Supreme Court, 6 the Christiansburg court has
seen fit to substitute its policy judgment for that of Congress.
In view of the primary role played by the EEOC in Title VII enforce-
ment, the need to encourage private attorneys general further is slight at
best. 87 Though the incremental increase in incentive to privately initiated
suits is small, the threat to the efficient functioning of the Congressionally
created enforcement mechanism, to legitimate employment practices and to
the integrity of the Title, as drafted and construed, is increased by an amount
quantifiable only upon future experience.
The equities are not all on the side of the plaintiff, as the Chris-
tiansburg majority asserts. Title VII, an exercise of the Congressional
power over interstate commerce,88 quite appropriately is concerned with
85. "[A] search for the meaning of the Title VII [attorneys' fees] provisions in the
language and application of other [attorneys' fees] statutes is to a great extent bound to be
sterile and unprofitable. A better guide is the underlying policy of Title VII." Walker, supra
note 39, at 505.
86. 421 U.S. at 263-64.
87. As previously noted, see note 46 and accompanying text supra, the back pay provi-
sion of Title VII provides substantial encouragement to many private attorneys general. In
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), the Supreme Court noted:
As the Court observed in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.. . . the primary objective [of
Title VII] was a prophylactic one: "[i]t was to achieve equality of employment
opportunities .... " Backpay has an obvious connection with this purpose. If em-
ployers faced only the prospect of an injunctive order, they would have little incentive
to shun practices of dubious legality. It is the reasonably certain prospect of a backpay
award that "provide[s] the spur or catalyst which causes employers and unions to self-
examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices. .... "
Id. at 417-18 (quoting United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973)).
88. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h) (Supp. V 1975) (definition of "industry affecting com-
merce").
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economic efficiency. An employer or union that successfully defends its
labor practices against unreasonable attack confers a substantial benefit on
commerce and vindicates the strong Congressional policy of efficient em-
ployment of labor.
Denying prevailing Title VII defendants the benefit of section 706(k),
except when subjected to suits brought in bad faith, is inappropriate. The
"reasonableness" standard, which would exclude all suits brought in bad
faith or upon unreasonable or meritless (though perhaps colorable) grounds,
more properly implements the policies of Title VII, and reflects more
accurately the equities of Title VII litigation.8 9
SAUL LouIs MOSKOWITZ
Criminal Law-Controlled Substances-North Carolina
Adopts a Novel View of Physician Punishment
Under Controlled Substances Act
One of the major concerns of state and federal legislation in the past
decade has been the illicit diversion of controlled substances from legitimate
channels of distribution. ' While courts interpreting this legislation generally
89. The reasonableness of a Title VII suit should, of course, be resolved by the trial court
by reference to the policies underlying Title VII and the equities of each case. Some factual
considerations are of particular relevance. The court should determine to what extent the
EEOC procedures were used to obtain settlement of the claim. A prior EEOC finding of no
reasonable cause, though not dispositive of the reasonableness issue, should be accorded heavy
weight, if based upon extensive investigation. Similarly, a conciliation agreement that was
refused by the plaintiff-complainant, if fair and reached by the EEOC and defendant in good
faith, should operate to thrust upon the plaintiff a greater risk of an adverse § 706(k) award. The
court can thereby promote the full and effective involvement of the EEOC in Title VII disputes.
Substantial abuse of the EEOC or court processes, including "bad faith" suits, seems to be
patently unreasonable. Abuse of less egregious sorts can be balanced along with other con-
siderations. Other considerations should be given weight. For example, did defendant prevail
on the merits or on procedural grounds? An award of attorneys' fees for prevailing on
procedural grounds does not further the policy of efficient allocation of labor for no labor
practices have been approved.
In weighing relevant factors, the benefits foreseeably flowing from a successful complaint
should be weighed according to the probability that success would have been realized. In the
instant case, the probability of success by the EEOC was low, because the argument that its
power to sue eo nomine was retroactive to 1965 was untenable in view of the wording of § 14.
See note 5 supra. If interpretation of that section had not been an issue of first impression, but
had been previously construed in a manner hostile to the EEOC position, the probability of
success would have been even lower. The probability of success turns, then, on what strength
the case of both parties could reasonably have been said to have at the outset of the litigation.
1. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1444, Pt. 1, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in
[19701 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4566, 4566 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT].
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have concluded that physicians who dispense drugs for invalid purposes are
subject to the same penalties as ordinary street traffickers, the North Caroli-
na Supreme Court recently gave a different interpretation to North
Carolina's statutory scheme. In State v. Best,2 a case in which a physician
was accused of the illegal sale and delivery of controlled substances, 3 the
court ruled that a dual system of punishment, based on the status of the
offender, exists in North Carolina.
Dr. Best's arrest4 resulted fromja statewide crackdown on physicians
conducted by a small investigative squad specifically constituted to probe
the diversion of prescription drugs. 5 He had prescribed Ritalin, a Schedule II
controlled substance,6 on three separate occasions to an agent who claimed
that she worked nights and "needed something to stay awake.'" The doctor
2. 292 N.C. 294, 233 S.E.2d 544 (1977). The indictments charged that "on or about the
19th day of March, 1975, in Pitt County Andrew Arthur Best unlawfully and wilfully did
feloniously sell and deliver a controlled substance . . . not within the normal course of his
professional practice .... Record at 13-14, State v. Best, 31 N.C. App. 250,229 S.E.2d 581
(1976). In addition to the charges discussed here, defendant was accused of selling a Schedule II
substance to two other State Bureau of Investigation agents on March 18, 1975 and March 6,
1975. Defendant was acquitted on these latter charges. 292 N.C. at 301, 233 S.E.2d at 549.
3. A "controlled substance" is a drug or other substance described in Schedules I
through VI of the Controlled Substances Act. It does not include distilled spirits, wine or
tobacco. 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) (1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-87(5) (1975); see notes 6, 8 & 82 infra.
The North Carolina Controlled Substances Act was amended seven times during the most
recent legislative session. For a comprehensive list of those amendments, see note 35 infra.
Amendments are cited elsewhere only when pertinent to the statutory language under discus-
sion.
4. Police stated that the charges against Dr. Best resulted from a four month undercover
operation by local officers and State Bureau of Investigation agents. Raleigh, N.C., News and
Observer, Mar. 27, 1975, § A, at I, col. 6.
5. North Carolina is one of the first states to concentrate enforcement efforts against
medical professionals who engage in the indiscriminate dispensing or issuing of prescriptions
for controlled substances. For a discussion of this program, see Davis, Drug Abuse Control:
Prescribing Controlled Substance Drugs, 6 CUM. L. REV. 331 (1975); Weir, Legitimate Drugs: A
Coordinated Effort to Prevent their Diversion into the Black Market, 4 CONTEMP. DRUG PROn.
483, 485 (1975).
6. A Schedule II controlled substance is one characterized by "a high potential for
abuse; currently accepted medical use in the United States, or currently accepted medical use
with severe restrictions; and the abuse of the substance may lead to severe psychic or physical
dependence." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-90 (1975 & Supp. 1975). Examples are methadone,
morphine, cocaine and amphetamines. Unless dispensed directly by a practitioner other than a
pharmacist to an ultimate user, these substances may be dispensed only on written prescription
except in certain emergency situations in which case an oral prescription must be reduced
promptly to writing. 21 U.S.C. § 829(a) (1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-106(a), (b) (1975), as
amended by Law of June 22, 1977, ch. 677, § 3(8), 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 267 (Pamphlet
No. 10, Pt. 1).
7. 292 N.C. at 295, 233 S.E.2d at 546. On her first visit to Dr. Best's office, the agent
gave a medical history and the receptionist weighed her and took her temperature and blood
pressure. Dr. Best, after conversing with the.oagent, issued the prescription for 36 pills. The
agent saw Dr. Best briefly on her second visit; she testified that she did not see him on her third
visit. Dr. Best testified that he did talk with her on her third visit and that he told her "she could
not stay on this medication forever." Id. at 299, 233 S.E.2d at 548. Each refill also was for 36
pills.
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also dispensed Phenobarbital, a Schedule IV controlled substance,' to her
when she complained of nervousness. The State maintained that such
activities were outside the usual course of a doctor's professional practice in
this state and were not for a legitimate medical purpose. 9 Dr. Best insisted
that he had used proper diagnostic procedures and was prescribing small,
carefully monitored quantities of Ritalin to treat intermittent narcolepsy. 10
Dr. Best also claimed that he dispensed the Phenobarbital to combat side
effects from the Ritalin after the agent told him that she had stopped taking
the stimulant drug. 1
Dr. Best was convicted of two counts of sale and delivery of Ritalin. 12
The court of appeals upheld the convictions.13 The North Carolina Supreme
Court reversed on the ground that Dr. Best had been charged under North
Carolina General Statutes section 90-95(a)(1)' 4 for the felonious "sale and
delivery" of a controlled substance while he should have been indicted
under section 90-108 for "distributing or dispensing" the drug. I5 The court
8. A Schedule IV controlled substance is one with "a low potential for abuse relative to
the substances listed in Schedule III of this Article; currently accepted medical use in the
United States; and limited physical or psychological dependence relative to the substances
listed in Schedule III of this Article." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-92 (Supp. 1975). An example is
tranquilizers. Except when dispensed directly by a practitioner to an ultimate user, Schedule IV
drugs must be dispensed by a prescription and oral prescriptions shall be reduced promptly to
writing. Limits are placed on the time and number of refills allowed. 21 U.S.C. § 829(b) (1970);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-106(c) (1975).
The agent's blood pressure and temperature were taken and she talked with the doctor
before the 115 Phenobarbital tablets were dispensed directly to her by him. 292 N.C. at 297, 233
S.E.2d at 546.
9. See 292 N.C. at 302, 233 S.E.2d at 549.
10. Id. at 299, 253 S.E.2d at 548. Narcolepsy is a sleeping disorder and is one of the
conditions for which Ritalin has a legitimate use. Id. at 298,233 S.E.2d at 547. Dr. Best testified
that he issued the two refills because his receptionist said that the agent had not reported any
side effects from the medication. Id. at 299, 233 S.E.2d at 548.
I1. Id. at 299, 233 S.E.2d at 548.
12. The convictions were for the two refill prescriptions. Id. at 301, 233 S.E.2d at 549.
13. 31 N.C. App. 250, 229 S.E.2d 581 (1976). The court of appeals dismissed Dr. Best's
argument that the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-86 to
-113.8 (1975 & Supp. 1975), was so imprecise as to be unconstitutionally vague. He had argued
that the standard applied to him under id. § 90-87(22)(a) (1975), "within the normal course of
professional practice," did not give adequate guidance to enable a physician to know when his
activities were outside the standard and therefore illegal prescriptions under the Act. The court
found the phrase not unacceptably vague because it gives the practitioner fair notice of the
standard he must follow to legally prescribe controlled substances under the statute. Id. at 264,
229 S.E.2d at 589. This conclusion follows that of the federal courts interpreting the similar
federal statute, e.g., United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1031 (1975); United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1973).
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(a)(1) (1975), enacted in 1973, amended Law of July 19, 1971,
ch. 919, § 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 1977. This section states that "[e]xcept as authorized by this
Article, it is unlawful for any person . . . [t]o manufacture, sell or deliver, or possess with
intent to manufacture, sell or deliver, a controlled substance."
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-108(a)(2) (1975) states that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person
who is . . .a practitioner to distribute or dispense a controlled substance in violation of G.S.
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explained that because a physician is authorized to write prescriptions for
controlled substances, he is not subject to the constraints of section 90-
95(a)(1). 16 If he writes a prescription "outside the normal course of profes-
sional practice in North Carolina and not for a legitimate medical purpose,"
however, the physician violates section 90-108.17 The court concluded that
"while the indictments follow the language of G.S. 90-95(a)(1), the evi-
dence discloses a violation, if at all, of G.S. 90-108 ' 18 and that because of
this "fatal variance," the court of appeals erred in not dismissing the
action. 19
The North Carolina Controlled Substances Act is patterned after federal
legislation that originated with the Harrison Act in 1914.20 The federal
statute, initially designed as a tax measure,21 had a primary purpose of
bringing "the domestic traffic in narcotics into the open under a licensing
system, so that sloppy dispensing practices of the day could be checked.' '22
The Harrison Act provided an explicit statutory exemption for the physician
who prescribed or dispensed narcotics "to a patient. . . in the course of his
professional practice only. ',23 As abuses in the drug area increased, Con-
gress passed numerous laws dealing with various aspects of the problem.24
Finally, in 1970, in an effort to coordinate the plethora of drug legislation
90-105 or 90-106." Id. § 90-105 states that "[controlled substances included in Schedules I and
II of this Article shall be distributed only by a registrant or practitioner, pursuant to an order
form." Id. § 90-106 (1975 & Supp. 1975), as amended by Law of June 22, 1977, ch. 667, § 3(8),
1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 267 (Pamphlet No. 10, Pt. 1), sets forth the prescription and
labeling requirements for the various schedules of controlled substances. See, e.g., notes 6 & 8
supra.
16. 292 N.C. at 310, 233 S.E.2d at 554.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 311, 233 S.E.2d at 554.
20. The Narcotic Drug Act of Dec. 17, 1914, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785. This was the first
significant legislative attempt to control drugs and drug traffic.
21. Recent Developments, District of Columbia Circuit Holds Severe Penalty Provision of
Controlled Substances Act Not Applicable to Registered Physician, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 179,
181 (1975).
22. King, The Narcotics Bureau and the Harrison Act: Jailing the Healers and the Sick, 62
YALE L.J. 736, 737 (1953).
23. The Narcotic Drug Act of Dec. 17, 1914, ch. 1, § 2(a), 38 Stat. 786. This phrase
has since been interpreted to mean that the physician who dispenses the narcotic drugs
mentioned in the Act is protected from prosecution under the Act only when he does not depart
from the usual course of medical practice. See Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189,
194 (1920). Note 13 supra discusses North Carolina's comparable phraseology. In United States
v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975), the Supreme Court cited Jin Fuey Moy and its progeny as proof
that the Harrison Act, predecessor of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-996
(West 1972 & Cum. Supp. 1977), contemplated conviction of physicians who acted outside the
usual course of medical practice under the same terms as applied to nonmedical traffickers. 423
U.S. at 132. The Moore Court added that there was no indication that Congress, in passing the
1970 Act, intended to change this treatment of doctors. Id. at 131-33, 139.
24. See HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 6, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.,
NEWS at 4571.
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and to devise a more flexible penalty structure that would strengthen law
enforcement, Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act (the Act).25 In
prosecutions under the Act, the overwhelming majority of federal courts that
have considered the matter have upheld convictions 26 of physicians for
violations under the general provision of the Act, which makes it unlawful
for "any person knowingly or intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense . . . a controlled substance.''27 Technical violations, such as
improper use of drug order forms or failure to employ a written prescription
when required, were punished under separate portions of the Act. 28 The
courts based their interpretation on the overall legislative purpose of the
Controlled Substances Act to strengthen enforcement and on the notion that
doctors who are also traffickers should be subject to the same penalties as
other drug offenders.29
25. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-996 (West 1972 & Cum. Supp. 1977); see HousE REPORT, supra note
-I, at 1, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4566. Harrison Act prosecutions
were based on the nature of the drug involved and a single penalty applied to all narcotic drugs.
In revising the penalty structure, Congress classified controlled substances into five categories
based on their potential for abuse, value for treatment and resulting psychological and physical
effects. Provisions were made for adding or removing drugs from the five schedules as new
medical evidence suggests. Thus, the legislative history of the Act shows that Congress has
continued to be concerned with the nature of the drug in the transaction rather than with the
status of the defendant. United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 133-34 (1975).
26. E.g., United States v. Badia, 490 F.2d 296 (1st Cir. 1973) (per curiam); United States
v. Bartee, 479 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1973);
cf. United States v. Leigh, 487 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1973) (allowing insufficient indictment to be
redrawn). Contra, United States v. Moore, 505 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 122
(1975).
27. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970) (emphasis added). The section more fully states that
"[e]xcept as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance." Compare North Carolina's version quoted in
note 14 supra.
Some of the factors that courts have considered relevant to convictions of physicians
under § 841 include lack of a physical examination before prescribing a controlled substance,
knowledge by the doctor that his patients are prone to trade or otherwise dispose of the drugs,
use of slang terms for the drugs by patients and/or doctor, telling patients to get their prescrip-
tions filled at different stores to prevent suspicion by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs, billing patients based on the quantity of drugs prescribed rather than on the medical
services performed, lack of supervision of administration of the drug, no precautions against
misuse or diversion, no known health complaints by patients and actual increases in drug usage
by patients while under the doctor's care. See United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975);
United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975); United
States v. Bartee, 479 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1973). State courts, construing their own versions of
the Federal Controlled Substances Act, have applied the equivalent of § 841 to doctors. E.g.,
State v. Vinson, 298 So. 2d 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Anderson v. State, 231 Ga. 243,201
S.E.2d 147 (1973).
28. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 842(a)(1) (1970) provides "[lit shall be unlawful for any person who
is subject to the requirements of part C to distribute or dispense a controlled substance in
violation of section 829 of this title." Persons, including doctors, who are required to register in
order to dispense controlled substances are subject to the requirements of part C. 21 U.S.C. §
829 (1970) outlines the proper procedure for issuing prescriptions. See notes 6 & 8 supra.
29. See United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 132(1975); HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at
1-4, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4566-71.
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In United States v. Moore ,30 the United States Supreme Court unani-
mously endorsed the view that physicians could be prosecuted under the
main felony provision of the Act.31 Stating that the legislative history of the
Act showed a Congressional concern with the nature of the drug transaction
rather than with the status of the defendant, the Court held that the relevant
inquiry was whether the activity itself fell within legitimate channels.32 The
Court noted that Congress expressed a particular concern because physicians
have the greatest access to controlled substances and had been responsible
for a large part of the illegal drug traffic. 33 It concluded,
We think it immaterial whether Dr. Moore also could have
been prosecuted for his violation of the statutory provisions relat-
ing to dispensing procedures. There is nothing in the statutory
scheme or legislative history that justifies a conclusion that a
registrant who may be prosecuted for the relatively minor offense
of violating § 829 [prescription requirements] is thereby exempted
from prosecution under § 841 for the sigiificantly greater offense
of acting as a drug "pusher. '34
The same concerns that led Congress to pass comprehensive federal
drug legislation prompted many states, including North Carolina,35 to pass
their own versions of the Act. The model for state legislation was the
30. 423 U.S. 122 (1975), rev'g 505 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
31. Before its reversal, the District of Columbia Circuit was the sole court of appeals
applying a lesser standard of punishment for a physician under the federal act. Dr. Moore was
charged in multiple counts with the unlawful distribution and dispensing of methadone, a
Schedule II substance, without obtaining the special authorization required for conducting a
maintenance program. 423 U.S. at 124. Among the most damaging testimony was that the
doctor's fees were based on the quantity of the drug prescribed rather than medical services
rendered and the fact that several patients dramatically increased their usage of drugs while
under his care. The doctor also felt the necessity of having armed guards at the entrance to his
office and kept a revolver on his desk.
The court of appeals based its decision on the overall statutory framework of the law to
"strongly suggest" that "Congress intended to deal with registrants primarily through a system
of administrative controls, relying on modest penalty provisions to enforce those controls, and
reserving the severe penalties provided for in § 841 for those seeking to avoid regulation entirely
by not registering." 505 F.2d at 430. For a discussion of this case, see Recent Developments,
supra note 21.
32. 423 U.S. at 135.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 138; accord, United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (defendant
does not have constitutional right to demand prosecution exclusively under the statute prescrib-
ing lesser penalties); see, e.g., notes 6 & 8 supra.
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-86 to -113.8 (1975 & Supp. 1975), as amended by Law of June
7, 1977, ch. 482, § 6, 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 112 (Pamphlet No. 9), Law of June 21, 1977,
ch. 642, § 2, 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 197-200 (Pamphlet No. 10, Pt. I), Law of June 22,
1977, ch. 667, § 3, 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 265-68 (Pamphlet No. 10, Pt. 1), Law of July 1,
1977, ch. 862, 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 404-05 (Pamphlet No. I1, Pt. I), Law of July 1, 1977,
ch. 891, 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 515-18 (Pamphlet No. 11, Pt. 2) & Law of July 1, 1977, ch.
907, 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 564-65 (Pamphlet No. I1, Pt. 2).
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Uniform Controlled Substances Act, 36 a set of provisions with the stated
purpose of supplying "an interlocking trellis of Federal and State law to
enable government at all levels to control more effectively the drug abuse
problem." ' 37 North Carolina's Controlled Substances Act, passed in 1971,
retains the primary attributes of the federal and uniform statutes. 38
With the exception of the Best opinion, all federal and state courts that
have considered the position of physicians in statutory schemes covering
drug offenses have found United States v. Moore dispositive of the mat-
ter. 39 In justifying its contrary position, the North Carolina Supreme Court
asserted that "several aspects of the North Carolina Controlled Substances
Act differ from both the Uniform Controlled Substances Act and the Federal
Controlled Substances Act and lend credence to the view which we have
taken. "4 Thus, an examination of the differences among the acts and their
36. UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES AcT, reprinted at 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED
146 (1973).
37. Id., Prefatory Note.
38. North Carolina added §§ 90-94, -95.1 to .3, -96.1, -98, -107, -108, -109.1, -112.1,
-113.4 to .6 t6 the Uniform Act. See 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 175-79 (1973).
In its brief in Best the State said that "the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act
basically tracts [sic] the United States Controlled Substances Act, the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 .... " New Brief for State at 17.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Fellman, 549 F.2d 181 (10th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); United
States v. Hooker, 541 F.2d 300 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815 (9th Cir.
1976); United States v. Hicks, 529 F.2d 841 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 856 (1976); United
States v. ElIzey, 527 F.2d 1306 (6th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); King v. State, 336 So. 2d 1200 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976); State v. Fearing, 30 Md. App. 134,351 A.2d 896 (1976); Commonwealth v.
Comins, - Mass. -, 356 N.E.2d 241 (1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1582 (1977); People v.
Alford, 73 Mich. App. 604, 251 N.W.2d 318 (1977); State v. Vaccaro, 142 N.J. Super. 167, 361
A.2d 47 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 71 N.J. 518, 366 A.2d 674 (1976). Two cases were
decided while Moore was on appeal and both of them applied § 841 to physicians. See United
States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975); United States v.
Green, 511 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1976).
40. 292 N.C. at 308, 233 S.E.2d at 553. In explaining its interpretation of the North
Carolina Act, the court said:
In skeletal form the present system of control over physicians operates as fol-
lows: (1) All transactions with controlled substances are prohibited by G.S. 90-95
except as authorized. (2) Under G.S. 90-101 a physician who meets established
objective critieria is authorized to make certain transactions with controlled sub-
stances and thus is exempted from the proscriptions of G.S. 90-95.
Id. at 303, 233 S.E.2d at 550. The "objective criteria" required by the court are that the person
meet the registration requirements of the Act and be engaged only in transactions using drugs
authorized by his registration. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-101(a), (b) (1975), as amended by Law
of June 22, 1977, ch. 667, § 3(6), 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 266 (Pamphlet No. 10, Pt. 1) &
Law of July 1, 1977, ch. 891, § 4(1), 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 517 (Pamphlet No. 11, Pt. 2).
Physicians are permitted to prescribe and dispense all drugs except those in Schedule I, defined
in note 82 infra. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-106 (1975 & Supp. 1975), as amended by Law of June 22,
1977, ch. 667, § 3(8), 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 267 (Pamphlet No. 10, Pt. 1); cf. United
States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d'190, 202 (9th Cir.) (dissent), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975)
(interpreting comparable federal statute). The court added that "[c]ontrol is reasserted under
G.S. 90-108 whereby the physician's actions with respect to these transactions must be within
the normal course of professional practice in this State and for a legitimate medical purpose."
292 N.C. at 303, 233 S.E.2d at 550. See generally note 15 supra.
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significance to North Carolina's regulatory scheme is essential to an under-
standing of the court's holding in State v. Best.
In Best, the North Carolina Supreme Court placed great emphasis on a
1973 amendment to section 90-95 that changed the wording of the pro-
hibited activity from "manufacture, distribute or dispense" to "manufac-
ture, sell or deliver.''41 From this action the court concluded:
By the use of "sell or deliver"-words of the street-rather than
"distribute or dispense"-which have technical medical connota-
tions and which are used extensively in those sections relating to
regulation of registrants and practitioners-the Legislature intend-
ed to clarify and emphasize the dual nature of the regulatory
scheme. 42
The new statutory language on which the North Carolina Supreme
Court relies has also been subject to interpretation by other courts. In
discussing whether a physician can properly be charged with the "sale" of a
controlled substance, the United States Supreme Court has maintained that
there is "no necessary repugnance between prescribing and selling." 4 3 In
reaching that conclusion, the Court relied heavily on the concept of the
physician as a principal who aids the patient in procuring an item that would
not otherwise be available to him.44 The North Carolina Criminal Code
contains a section comparable to the federal statute regarding aiding and
abetting.45 This section, it would seem, provides an analogous statutory
41. See 292 N.C. at 303-04, 233 S.E.2d at 550.
42. Id. at 309-10, 233 S.E.2d at 554.
43. Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189, 192 (1920). Defendant argued that the
act of selling or giving away a drug and the act of issuing a prescription are so essentially
different that to allege he sold the drug by prescribing it amounts to a contradiction of terms and
this repugnance renders the indictment fatally defective. The Court, dismissing the argument,
explained that "one may take a principal part in a prohibited sale of an opium derivative. . . by
unlawfully issuing a prescription to the would-be purchaser." Id.
Recent cases relying on Jin Fuey Moy include United States v. Bartee, 479 F.2d 484 (10th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1973); State v. Vinson, 298 So. 2d 505
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); accord, United States v. Bloom, 164 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 333 U.S. 857 (1948); United States v. Brandenburg, 162 F.2d980 (3d Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 769 (1947); United States v. Brandenburg, 155 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1946); Nigro v.
United States, 117 F.2d 624 (8th Cir. 1941) (all decided under Harrison Act). The United States
Supreme Court recently affirmed the vitality of these cases as precedent in United States v.
Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975).
44. Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189, 192 (1920).
45. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1970) with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-5 (1971), which states that
"[i]f any person shall counsel, procure or command any other person to commit any felony
. . . the person so counseling, procuring or commanding shall be guilty of a felony. ... One
of the many cases interpreting this statute provides that "[a]ll who are present," either actively
or constructively, "at the place of a crime and are either aiding, abetting, assisting, or advising
in its commission, or are present for such purpose," are principals in the crime. State v.
Dawson, 281 N.C. 645, 655, 190 S.E.2d 196, 202 (1972); accord, State v. Ball, 270 N.C. 25, 153
S.E.2d 741 (1967); State v. Spears, 268 N.C. 303, 150 S.E.2d 499 (1966); State v. Jarrell, 141
N.C. 722, 53 S.E. 127 (1906); State '. Gaston, 73 N.C. 93 (1875); State v. Torain, 20 N.C. App.
69, 200 S.E.2d 665 (1973), cert. denied, 284 N.C. 622 (1974).
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framework within which to interpret the Act. The North Carolina Supreme
Court, however, in arriving at a different conclusion from the United States
Supreme Court, provided no explanation for the variation in interpretations.
Similar problems in statutory interpretation arise in concluding that a
physician cannot be properly indicted for the "delivery" of a controlled
substance. In drafting the Uniform Act's primary felony section, the Com-
missioners deliberately chose the term "deliver" because it encompasses
both distributing and dispensing activities!46 Thus, it is reasonable to con-
clude that the North Carolina General Assembly did not merely substitute a
street term for a medical one, but that it chose the most comprehensive word
to describe a physician's activity in providing controlled substances to
others. 47 Generally, the correct method of statutory interpretation is that
enunciated by the North Carolina Supreme Court: "In the construction of
any statute. . . words must be given their common and ordinary meaning,
nothing else appearing. . . .[When] the statute itself, contains a definition
of a word used therein, that definition controls, however contrary to the
ordinary meaning of the word it may be. "48 Therefore, the "street" conno-
tation of "deliver" must be discarded in favor of the Act's definition, which
is "the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to
another of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an agency relation-
ship." 49 "Constructive delivery" has been held to include the issuing of a
46. UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT § 401, Commissioner's Note. Since the
passage of the Federal Act in 1970, a battle has raged in the courts over whether a physician
"distributes" or "dispenses" a drug. Courts holding that the proper term is "dispense" include
United States v. Green, 511 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975); United
States v. Leigh, 487 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bartee, 479 F.2d 484 (10th Cir.
i973). See also United States v. Hicks, 529 F.2d 841 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 856
(1976). Those maintaining that "distribute" is the correct term are United States v. ElIzey, 527
F.2d 1306 (6th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975); United States v. Badia, 490 F.2d 296 (1st Cir. 1973) (per curiam);
United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1973). Helpful discussions of this distinction
may be found in United States v. Fellman, 549 F.2d 181, 182 (10th Cir. 1977) (per curiam);
Commonwealth v. Comins, - Mass. -, 356 N.E.2d 241 (1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1582
(1977); People v. Alford, 73 Mich. App. 604, 251 N.W.2d 314 (1977).
Moore did not resolve the dispute. In that case the indictment charged both distribution
and dispensing. 423 U.S. at 124; see note 31 supra. One court has condemned this argument as
being based on a "hyper-technical distinction" between the two terms even though there is no
"functional difference" in the context of the physician cases. United States v. Fellman, 549
F.2d at 182. Cf. Commonwealth v. Comins, - Mass. -, 356 N.E.2d241 (1976), cert. denied, 97
S. Ct. 1582 (1977) (choice of words should not be permitted to become crucial).
47. One factor supporting this view is the Uniform Act provision that it is to be "so
applied and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect
to the subject of this Act among those states which enact it." UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUB-
STANCES ACT § 603. See generally Barton, Controlled Substances Act of 1971, 52 MICH. ST. B.J.
617, 621, 623 (1973).
48. In re Clayton-Marcus Co., 286 N.C. 215, 219, 210 S.E.2d 199, 202-03 (1974); accord,
Johnston v. Gill, 224 N.C. 638, 32 S.E.2d 30 (1944); In re Steelman, 219 N.C. 306, 13 S.E.2d 544
(1941); Morris v. Laughlin Chevrolet Co., 217 N.C. 428, 8 S.E.2d 484 (1940).
49. 21 U.S.C. § 802(8) (1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-87(7) (1975); UNIFORM CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCES ACT § 101(f).
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prescription. 50 Moreover, the terms "dispense" and "distribute," as identi-
cally defined in the North Carolina, Federal and Uniform Acts, are de-
scribed in terms of the "delivery" of a controlled substance.5 Thus, it is
extremely doubtful that a legislative intent to restrict the application of
section 90-95 solely to street traffickers can be inferred from the change of
language.52
The Best court also distinguished the North Carolina Act from its
federal and uniform counterparts on the basis of section 90-101(c)(4), which
exempted "practitioners licensed in North Carolina" from having to register
with the North Carolina Drug Authority in order to possess, distribute or
dispense a controlled substance. 53 The court discerned from this provision a
50. State v. Vinson, 298 So. 2d 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974). The Vinson Court
interpreted the Florida law, which is phrased in the same terms as the North Carolina one: "[I]t
is unlawful for any person to sell, manufacture, or deliver. . . a controlled substance." FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 893.13(l)(a) (West 1976). The court specifically addressed the question whether
delivery of a drug could include the issuance of a prescription and relied on the definition of
"delivery" identically contained in the federal, uniform, Florida and North Carolina statutes.
The court concluded that the issuance of a prescription by a physician was a form of "construc-
tive" delivery and it was no defense that the actual transfer of the drug would be made by a
pharmacist pursuant to the order of the prescription. 298 So. 2d at 507; accord, King v. State,
336 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); People v. Alford, 73 Mich. App. 604,251 N.W.2d 314
(1977). See generally State v. Howell, 196 Neb. 832, 246 N.W.2d 479 (1976); State v. Guyott,
195 Neb. 593, 239 N.W.2d 781 (1976).
51. " 'Dispense' means to deliver a controlled substance to an ultimate user or research
subject by or pursuant to the lawful order of a practitioner, including the prescribing, adminis-
tering, packaging, labeling, or compounding necessary to prepare the substance for that deliv-
ery." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-87(8) (1975); UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT § 101(g). 21
U'S.C. § 802(10) (1970) is identical in the pertinent parts.
"'Distribute' means to deliver other than by administering or dispensing a controlled
substance." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-87(10) (1975); UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT §
101(i). 21 U.S.C. § 802(11) (1970) is identical in the pertinent parts.
52. In support of its view, the North Carolina Supreme Court states that the words
"distribute or dispense" are terms confined to "technical medical connotations." 292 N.C. at
309, 233 S.E.2d at 554. This is an arguable proposition. A number of other state and federal
courts have convicted street pushers of "dispensing" and/or "distributing" drugs. Those that
have convicted street pushers of "distributing" include United States v. Joseph, 533 F.2d 282
(5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1698 (1977); United States v. Garcia, 528 F.2d 580 (5th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Oquendo, 505 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Visuna,
395 F. Supp. 352 (S.D. Fla.), aff'd, 524 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1975). Other courts have convicted
nonmedical people of "dispensing," e.g., People v. Fenninger, - Colo. -, 552 P.2d 1018
(1976); People v. Dinkel, - Colo. -, 541 P.2d 898 (1975). One commentator has suggested that
the primary purpose of the amendment was to alter provisions of the Act concerning the use of
prior convictions under the Act and to change the statutory presumption concerning possession
as it relates to intent to sell. Interview with Michael Crowell, Associate Professor, Institute of
Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, in Chapel Hill (Aug. 29, 1977). Since
no legislative intent to attach such significance to the change in wording appears from the
available documentation describing the history of the amendment, it seems that the court's
reliance on the legislature's intentions is suspect. See NORTH CAROLINA SOLICITORS' ASS'N,
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE 1973 GENERAL ASSEMBLY FOR LEGISLATION AFFECTING CRIMINAL
LAW 34 (1973) (distributed to each legislator); Crumpler, Controlled Substances Act, POPULAR
GOV'T, June 1973, at 13 (summary of legislative action on Controlled Substances Act).
53. Law of July 19, 1971, ch. 919, § 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1492 (formerly codified at
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legislative intent to exempt the practitioner from the provisions of section
90-95 by virtue of his status as a doctor.-4 This distinction, however,
appears to have a weak substantive foundation. Although the Federal Act
does require yearly registration by all physicians who dispense controlled
substances, 55 such registration is pro forma-the Attorney General has no
discretion to refuse the registration of any physician who is properly li-
censed by a state authority. 56 Moreover, physicians who do not dispense reg-
ulated drugs from their offices but who merely administer or prescribe
them are subject to no federal registration requirements. 57 Thus, the minimal
registration requirements placed on doctors by the federal government
reflect only a minor difference in the attitudes of the Federal and North
Carolina Acts toward the treatment of doctors and appears insufficient to
justify a difference in application of the primary felony provisions of the
respective Acts.
In addition, the North Carolina Supreme Court justified its interpreta-
tion of the North Carolina Act on the basis that, unlike the Federal Act,5" it
provides "essentially the same" penalties for both medical and nonmedical
offenders. 59 The court added that, while "minor penalties" are provided in
the federal counterpart of section 90-108, there are "potentially stiff penal-
ties" under the North Carolina section, thereby indicating that "the Legisla-
ture felt that the unlawful acts proscribed . . . were more than minor
'technical violations' . . . .60
Although the court stated that the penalties for medical and nonmedical
offenders are "essentially the same," the latter are subject to a maximum
penalty for a first offense of illegally distributing a Schedule II substance of
ten years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. 6' In contrast, physicians who
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-101(c)(4) (1975)).This section was repealed by Law of July 1, 1977, ch.
891, § 4(2), 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 517 (Pamphlet No. 11, Pt. 2).
54. 292 N.C. at 305, 233 S.E.2d at 551.
55. 21 U.S.C. § 822(a) (1970).
56. United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. at 140-41. 21 U.S.C. § 823(0 (1970) states that
"[p]ractitioners shall be registered to dispense or conduct research with controlled substances
in schedule If, I1, IV, ir V if they are authorized to dispense or conduct research under the law
of the State in which they practice." The only restriction applied by the Federal Act is that
special registration with the Attorney General is required to authorize a physician to deal in
Schedule I drugs, those controlled substances that have no accepted value for medical treat-
ment. See id. § 823 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1; Recent Devel-
opments, supra note 21, at 184.
57. Davis, supra note 5, at 344.
58. In drafting the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, the Commissioners, believing that
such matters should be left to the discretion of the states, included no penalty provisions.
UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCEs AcT, Prefatory Note.
59. 292 N.C. at 308-09, 233 S.E.2d at 553.
60. Id. at 309, 233 S.E.2d at 553.
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(b)(1) (1975).
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dispense a Schedule II substance outside the course of their professional
practice are subject to a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment and a
$5000 fine.62 Although all convictions for sale or delivery under section 90-
95 are classified as felonies, physicians are considered guilty of only a
misdemeanor unless it is established that they committed the offense inten-
tionally. 63 Thus, a higher burden of proof is required to convict a physician
of a felonious drug offense than to convict a street dealer of the same type of
offense. Although there may be merit to lesser punishment of physicians for
such transgressions, comparison of sections 90-95 and 90-108 refutes the
argument that the penalties for violations are "essentially the same" for
both groups.
This difference is magnified upon subsequent violations of the Con-
trolled Substances Act. If the Best decision is interpreted as meaning that
the practitioner is totally "exempted from the proscriptions of section 90-
95,'"'1 then he would receive no additional punishment for subsequent
offenses, since section 90-108 makes no provision for additional penalties
under such circumstances. 65 In contrast, for a conviction under section 90-
95 following conviction for two or more felonies under the same section, a
defendant can receive up to thirty years in prison and a $30,000 fine. 66
In addition, the federal penalties referred to as "minor" by the North
Carolina Supreme Court are not without substance. 67 Substantial sanctions
are provided for commercial type offenses (a maximum of one year impris-
onment and $25,000 fine)68 and for fraudulent offenses committed inten-
tionally or knowingly (a maximum of four years imprisonment and $30,000
fine). 69 The maximum penalty in North Carolina for similar offenses is the
section 90-108 sanction of five years imprisonment and $5000 fine for an
intentional offense.70 In view of the lack of a major difference in the federal
and state penalties for such violations, it is difficult to discern a definitive
62. Id. § 90-108(b).
63. Id.
64. 292 N.C. at 303, 305, 233 S.E.2d at 550, 551.
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-108(b) (1975).
66. Id. § 90-95(e)(2).
67. Ironically, Judge Ely in his dissent to United States v. Rosenberg used the stiff
punishments prescribed under the federal counterpart of § 90-108 to justify treatment of doctors
solely under those sections. 515 F.2d 190, 201 (9th Cir.) (dissent), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031
(1975). Even though he was convinced that the federal law established a separate system for
punishing physicians who prescribe Schedule II through V drugs outside the course of accepted
medical practice, however, Judge Ely thought it significant that the Act confers no authority on
registered physicians to deal in Schedule I controlled substances. Therefore, he maintained that
a physician may illegally dispense Schedule I controlled substances and be prosecuted under §
841, the primary felony provision, for so doing. Id. at 202.
68. 21 U.S.C. § 842(c) (1970).
69. Id. § 843(c).
70. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-108(b) (1975).
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legislative intent to regard these violations in North Carolina in any different
light from their federal counterparts. 7 '
Finally, the court emphasized that "[i]t is apparent that the North
Carolina Drug Commission. .. views [the Act] as establishing a parallel
system" 72 and added that "[w]here an issue of statutory construction arises,
the construction adopted by those charged with the execution and admini-
stration of the law is relevant and may be considered." ' 73 It is difficult,
however, to perceive such an interpretation from the publications of the
Commission. Their Physicians' Reference on Drug Laws and Emergency
Treatment,74 cited by the court in support of its analysis, 75 states that
practitioners are "primarily concerned" with the prohibitions of section 90-
108.76 Clearly, the vast majority of doctors need only ensure compliance
with the technical aspects of dispensing controlled substances since they
routinely confine the issuance of such drugs to the accepted course of
professional practice. The use of the word "primarily," however, suggests
that other provisions may be of secondary concern to the physician. 77 There
is no suggestion that physicians who violate a provision of the Controlled
Substances Act should be charged under any language other than the
"manufacture, sale or delivery" of the drug-at, least in situations where
their conduct is comparable to that of a trafficker.
The interpretation by the North Carolina Supreme Court of the state's
Controlled Substances Act represents a radical departure from the view
taken by the United States Supreme Court and the federal and state tribunals
that have considered legislation substantially similar to the North Carolina
scheme. If the North Carolina court's opinion is read broadly, it opens the
way for unscrupulous practitioners to sell drugs "primarily for the profits to
be derived therefrom" 78 without being subject to the same severe criminal
71. This regulatory structure could also be viewed as enacting substantial penalties for
acts such as fraudulent practices, improper use of order blanks and illegal issuance of prescrip-
tions in order to deter such conduct while retaining even harsher penalties for conduct that is
equivalent to that of the street trafficker.
72. 292 N.C. at 308, 233 S.E.2d at 553.
73. Id.
74. NORTH CAROLINA DRUG AUTHORITY, PHYSICIANS' REFERENCE ON DRUG LAWS AND
EMERGENCY TREATMENT (1972).
75. 292 N.C. at 308, 233 S.E.2d at 553.
76. NORTH CAROLINA DRUG AUTHORITY, supra note 74, at 11-12.
77. Another publication of the Commission, which provides sample arrest warrant forms,
only sets forth language paralleling the wording of § 90-95, the primary felony section. NORTH
CAROLINA DRUG AUTHORITY, DRUG LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA (INCLUDING REGULATIONS) 155-
66 app. (1975).
78. United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. at 135 (quoting HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10,
reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4575).
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penalties that apply to their nonmedical counterparts. 79 Another conse-
quence of the court's opinion is that prosecutors must be extremely careful
in wording their indictments. If medical practitioners are charged with
"selling or delivering" or street traffickers with "dispensing or distribut-
ing," a fatal variance will result.
80
It is unfortunate that the North Carolina Supreme Court chose to
interpret the entire Controlled Substances Act in a manner that is not
supported by either logic or precedent. The court could have avoided the
massive statutory interpretation it undertook and reached the same result by
ruling that the evidence was not sufficient for a conviction under the Act. l
The physician who employs controlled substances in treatment of his pa-
tients is faced with very real and very serious problems: because it is
acknowledged that all controlled substances except those in Schedule 182
have useful and legitimate medical purposes, he must be given the flexibility
79. The concern felt by the courts that refused to find a dual system of regulation was
voiced by the Rosenberg opinion in that since registration is pro forma for the most part, the
physician would be able to "stand on [any] street corner and sell prescriptions to passersby"
with impunity because he would not be writing prescriptions but personally delivering con-
trolled substances. 515 F.2d 190, 194 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975). Under a dual
system the penalties for violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 842 and 843 would be triggered by a violation
of § 829, which requires a written- prescription "[e]xcept when dispensed directly by a prac-
titioner. . . to an ultimate user." Thus, directly dispensing a drug without a prescription would
not be a violation under those two sections. For a further exposition on this shortcoming of a
dual system of regulation, see Recent Developments, supra note 21, at 190.
Furthermore, the same deleterious effects are felt by the addict and society whether or not
the source of supply is a medical one, especially in light of statistics estimating that physicians,
pharmacists and other professionals are currently the source, intentionally or not, of as much as
90% of the dangerous drugs found in the illicit market. Weir, supra note 5, at 484.
80. Because of the acceptance by other courts of indictments charging physicians with the
sale or delivery of a controlled substance, it is questionable whether there was a fatal variance
in this indictment. The indictments that charged Dr. Best, although they tracked the "sell and
deliver" language of § 90-95, stated no violation of any particular section of the North Carolina
Act. See text accompanying notes 18 & 19 supra. The controlling factor should be that argued
by the State in Best:
[I]n reaching a determination as to whether or not there is a fatal defect in an
indictment, the primary consideration is whether or not the indictment informed the
defendant of the charges against him in order that he might prepare a defense and
protect himself from another prosecution for the same offense.
New Brief for the State at 20 (citations omitted). There would seem to be no question here that
Dr. Best was made fully aware of the crimes with which he was charged. Accord, United States
v. Fellman, 549 F.2d 181, 182 (10th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
81. One only needs examine the facts of the Moore case and others to recognize that Dr.
Best's alleged conduct falls far below the level of abuses that have resulted in convictions for
substantive violations of the Controlled Substances Acts. See text accompanying notes 26-28
supra.
82. A Schedule I drug is defined as one with a "high potential for abuse, no currently
accepted medical use in the United States, or a lack of accepted safety for use in treatment
under medical supervision." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-89 (1975 & Supp. 1975). Examples are
heroin and lysergic acid diethylamaide (LSD). See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (1970).
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to use them in a manner that will most effectively help his patients without
the worry of being second-guessed by a jury.83
By the time the North Carolina legislature passed its version of the Act
and subsequent amendments thereto, other similar acts had been interpreted
by a number of state and federal courts. The North Carolina Supreme Court
has in effect changed the legislative history of the Act and denied the
legislature the insight that comes from studying and evaluating similar
statutes.
ANN LASHLEY SAWYER
83. Also, the ongoing updating of drug schedules requires consfant attention by the busy
practitioner. Compounding this problem is the fact that often,
"detailmen," employees of drug companies, are a major source of. . . information
regarding new drugs or developments concerning drugs already on the market, It is
highly improbable that this source or the advertisements in medical journals keep the
physician abreast of what the drug culture has discovered for new "highs" or what
group is abusing what drug.
Davis, supra note 5, at 360.
There are compelling policy reasons for punishing doctors differently than other persons
for violatons of the controlled substances laws. In United States v. Moore, the Supreme Court
noted that
Congress understandably was concerned that the drug laws not impede legitimate
research and that physicians be allowed reasonable discretion in treating patients and
testing new theories ...
In enacting the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970
. . . Congress faced the problem directly. Because of the potential for abuse it
decided that some limits on free experimentation with drugs were necessary.
423 U.S. at 143. The Court added that Congress required the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare, in consultation with the Attorney General and national professional organizations,
to determine the appropriate professional standards for treating addicts in order to provide
clarification for the medical profession. Id. at 144. Prior to this time many doctors were afraid
to take addicts as patients because of the uncertain state of the law.
In arguing for a new approach to the problem by legislatures, courts, medical schools and
the medical profession, Professor Davis observes that
Drug abuse is not confined to the narcotic addict nor to the user of hallucinogens.
Medicine cabinets across the country are filled with stimulants and depressants pre-
scribed by overworked physicians catering to an uptight, overweight populace. As real
and tragic as this situation is, one must, nonetheless, question whether the criminal
sanctions imposed upon the medical community are really the answer. Perhaps the
underlying problem and the ultimate solution lie in the areas of professional responsi-
bility and medical ethics.
Davis, supra at 359.
The same system of punishment, however, should apply to all who dispense or distribute
Schedule I drugs. The North Carolina Supreme Court seems to support this view. Although it
says that transactions that are exempted from the proscriptions of § 90-95 are those that involve
drugs authorized by other provisions of the Act, such transactions would not include the
dispensing or distributing of Schedule I drugs by practitioners. Thus, it is arguable that if faced
squarely with the question, the court would hold physicians who sell or deliver heroin, LSD or
other Schedule I substances subject to the penalties under § 90-95.
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Remedies-Domestic Relations: Garnishment for Child Support
The incidence of marital disruption in our society is of serious and
escalating proportions. Whether by annulment, separation or divorce, an
increasing number of families have been left destitute by the parents who
commonly provided for them. The burden on the state and federal govern-
ments, and vicariously on the taxpayer, to provide support for deserted
families, is of such magnitude as to have necessitated the payment of seven
billion dollars -to families under the Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren Act1 (AFDC) in 1974.2 As of June 1974, over eighty percent of
families receiving AFDC benefits required the aid due to parental nonsup-
port.3 Enforcement of spousal and child support orders has been chronically
inadequate and unsatisfactory. In 1975 Congress reacted with the enactment
of the Title IV D program, which was designed to improve enforcement of
child support payments by instituting a network of state operated, federally
monitored support programs. 4
In response to this legislation, North Carolina amended Chapter 110 of
the General Statutes by the addition of Article 9, providing a system for
child support enforcement conforming with federal requirements. 5 Most
significant in this enactment was the addition of an "independent" garnish-
ment proceeding for the enforcement of child support6-'"independent"
because it is technically free of the limitations commonly associated with
wage garnishment in North Carolina. Briefly, the statute7 allows for gar-
1. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-610 (West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977). An estimated 11 million
families are recipients of AFDC. AFDC was established "[flor the purpose of encouraging the
care of dependent children in their own homes. . . by enabling each State to furnish financial
assistance and rehabilitation . . . to needy dependent children . .. to help maintain and
strengthen family life." Id.
2. Ehrlich, A New National Family Law, 65 ILL. B.J. 70, 77 (1976).
3. SENATE FINANCE COMM., SOCIAL SERVICES AMENDMENTS OF 1974, S. REP. No. 1356,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 8133, 8145-46.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-660 (Supp. V 1975).
5. Law of June 25, 1975, ch. 827, § 1, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 1166.
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(0(4) (1976) provides the remedy of garnishment for
enforcement of child support. In 1975 the section was amended to read: " 'In addition, an
independent garnishment proceeding, as provided in G.S. 11OA-9 [sic], shall be available for
enforcement of child-support obligations.' "Law of June 24, 1975, ch. 814, § 1, 1975 N.C. Sess.
Laws 1155.
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-136 (Supp. 1975) provides:
Garnishment for enforcement of child-support obligation.-(a) Notwithstanding
any other provision of the law, in any case in which a responsible parent is under a
court order or has entered into a written agreement pursuant to G.S. 110-132 or 110-
133 to provide child support, a judge. . . may enter an order of garnishment whereby
no more than 20 percent (20%) of the responsible parent's monthly disposable earnings
shall be garnished for the support of his minor child. . . .The garnishee is the person,
firm, association, or corporation by whom the responsible parent is employed.
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nishment of up to twenty percent of a responsible parent's monthly income. 8
Under order of court, the employer of the delinquent parent is required on a
continuing basis to submit the ordered amount of the employee's wages to
the clerk of court under threat of contempt for noncompliance. 9 In theory,
this statute provides the most effective means for enforcement of support
payments; yet, as a consequence of legislative and judicial reluctance to
garnish wages in North Carolina and of deficiencies in the statute itself, the
remedy has unfortunately been of only limited use as yet.
The importance of this new remedy is emphasized by an examination
of the relatively ineffective measures heretofore available to dependent
families in North Carolina. Sections 50-13.4 and 50-16.710 of the North
Carolina General Statutes provide in similar language the procedures for
bringing actions for child support and alimony respectively. Payments to
dependents may be ordered paid by lump sum payment, periodic payments
or by transfer of personal and real property. 11 Of these modes of payment,
the provision for periodic payments presents the only viable means by which
a less affluent individual can comply with his duty of support. The real
problems arise, however, when the responsible parent becomes recalcitrant
and the support order must be enforced. Enforcement of support payments
by means of execution, 12 appointment of receiver, 13 injunction, 4 or attach-
(b) The mother, father, custodian, or guardian of the child or any cdunty
interested in the support of a dependent child may petition the court for an order of
garnishment. The petition shall be verified and shall state that the responsible parent is
under court order or has entered into a written agreement pursuant to G.S. 110-132 or
110-133 to provide child support, that said parent is delinquent in such child support or
has been erratic in making child-support payments, the name and address of the
employer of the responsible parent, the responsible parent's monthly disposable
earnings ...
(c) A hearing on the petition shall be held within 10 days after the time for
response has elapsed or within 10 days after the responses of both the responsible
parent and the garnishee have actually been filed. . . . If an order of garnishment is
entered, a copy of same shall be served on the responsible parent and the garnishee
either personally or by registered mail, return receipt requested. The order shall set
forth sufficient findings of fact to support the action by the court and the amount to be
garnished for each pay period. The order shall be subject to review for modification
and dissolution upon the filing of a motion in the cause.
(d) Upon receipt of an order of garnishment, the garnishee shall transmit with-
out delay to the clerk of the superior court the amount ordered by the court to be
garnished. These funds shall be disbursed to the party designated by the court which in
those cases of dependent children receiving public assistance shall be the North
Carolina Department of Human Resources.
(e) Any garnishee violating the terms of an order of garnishment shall be subject
to punishment as for contempt.
8. Id. § 110-136(a).
9. Id. § 110-136(d), (e).
10. Id. § 50-13.4 (1976), as amended by Law of June 23, 1977, ch. 711, § 26, 1977 N.C.
Adv. Legis. Serv. 464 (Pamphlet No. 10, Pt. 2) (provisions for child support); id. § 50-16.7
(provisions for alimony).
I. Id. §§ 50-13.4(e), -16.7(a).
12. Id. §§ 50-13.4(f)(10), -16.7(k). Seegenerally 2 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW
§ 158, at 248-50 (1963) (wife stands in the position of a judgment creditor of the husband; she is
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ment and garnishment15 of property owned by the responsible parent is
ineffective to aid the family of a parent who owns no tangible property and
whose only asset is his ability to work. Furthermore, the primary enforce-
ment technique of contempt16 accomplishes merely an endless succession of
threats from the court ending often with the imprisonment of the responsible
parent, making the possibility of payment of support even more remote.
Prior to the enactment of section 110-136 only two remedies, buried
within the expansive provisions of sections 50-13.4 and 50-16.7, had
provided practical alternatives to these basically futile measures of support
enforcement. Both are directed at the primary asset of the less affluent
family, the wages of the responsible parent. The first statutory remedy is
assignment of wages. 17 The court may require the responsible parent to
execute an assignment of wages or other income due or to become due. The
statutory language indicates that wages not yet earned are subject to assign-
ment; this feature makes the remedy particularly well adapted to the con-
tinuing nature of a support order. Such an assignment, however, is a two-
party agreement that does not involve the employer, is detached from the
court, and is thus difficult to enforce.1 8 As a result, under this arrangement it
is common for a responsible parent to spend his income before his depen-
dents have any opportunity to benefit from the assignment.
The second of these two remedies is a limited form of wage garnish-
ment. It has an advantage over assignment for it is directed at the employer
and intercepts wages before they reach the hands of the responsible parent. 19
The statute provides that dependents may avail themselves of the garnish-
ment proceedings available to general creditors, and for this purpose they
entitled to the issuance of execution upon real and personal property of the husband to enforce
payment of an alimony award).
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-13.4(f)(6), -16.7(g) (1976). See generally R. LEE, supra note 12,
§ 160, at 254 (a receiver holds property of the responsible parent for the benefit of all interested
parties).
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-13.4(f)(5), -16.7(f) (1976). See generally R. LEE, supra note 12,
§ 160, at 256-57 (restrains responsible parent from disposing of property pending litigation).
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-13.4(f)(4), -16.7(e) (1976). See generally R. LEE, supra note 12,
§ 159, at 250-51 (preliminary actions subjecting property of responsible parent, in his possession
or the possession of another, to execution).
16. Law of June 23, 1977, ch. 711, § 26, 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 464 (Pamphlet No.
10, Pt. 2) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-13.4(f)(9), -16.7(j)). See generally R. LEE,
supra note 12, § 166, at 276-78 (imprisonment for wilful disobedience of a court order for
support; an order to pay support is not a debt so as to raise prohibitions against debtor's
imprisonment).
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-13.4(f)(1), 16.7(b) (1976).
18. See, e.g., Parker v. Parker, 13 N.C. App. 616, 186 S.E.2d 607 (1972).
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-16.7(e), -13.4(f)(4) (1976). Prior to the enactment of these
statutes, several North Carolina decisions had stated in dicta that wages could be garnished for
the benefit of a deserted spouse. See, e.g., Porter v. Citizens Bank, 251 N.C. 573, 579, 111
S.E.2d 904, 909 (1960); Walton v. Walton, 178 N.C. 73, 75, 100 S.E. 176, 177 (1919).
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are treated as creditors of the responsible parent. Under these provisions,
however, prospective earnings are not garnishable as they are under the
newer section 110-136.20
Garnishment is a proceeding ancillary to attachment2' and is the reme-
dy for discovering and subjecting to attachment tangible property of the
defendant not in his possession and any indebtedness owed to the defend-
ant.22 Although no cases have been decided on this point under the garnish-
ment statute, it would appear that the use of the term "indebtedness"
excludes unearned wages as property subject to garnishment; until wages
are earned, no debt is owing to an employee from his employer. Motor
Finance Co. v. Putnam,23 a 1948 case interpreting the North Carolina
execution statutes, lends support to this assumption. 24 There, the North
Carolina Supreme Court stated:
[I]t is plain that a supplemental proceeding against a third person is
designed to reach and apply to the satisfaction of the judgment
. . debts due to the judgment debtor by the third person at the
time of the issuance and service of the order for the examination of
the third person. Prospective earnings of a judgment debtor are
entirely hypothetical. They are neither property nor a debt.2
No other explanation for the prohibition against garnishing prospective
wages has been articulated other than that they are "hypothetical." 26 More
than likely, the limitation of garnishment to wages due and owing is a
manifestation of a general distaste for wage garnishment and a concern for
the disastrous effects even a single garnishment may have on a family's
economic stability. 27
20. For the first and only reported application of § 110-136, see Watson v. Watson, 424 F.
Supp. 866 (E.D.N.C. 1976), in which a retired army colonel's future retirement pay was
subjected to garnishment for child support.
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.1(a) (1969) provides:
Attachment is a proceeding ancillary to a pending principle action, is in the nature of a
preliminary execution against property, and is intended to bring property of a defend-
ant within the legal custody of the court in order that it may subsequently be applied to
the satisfaction of any judgment for money which may be rendered against the
defendant in the principle action.
22. Id. § 1-440.21.
23. 229 N.C. 555, 50 S.E.2d 670 (1948).
24. The court in its interpretation of the statutes relied heavily upon a New York case, In
re Trustees of Bd. of Publication, 22 Misc. 645, 50 N.Y.S. 171 (Sup. Ct. 1898), that had ruled
prospective wages non-garnishable under a statute that served as a model for North Carolina's
statutes.
It is interesting to note that New York now allows execution upon income. An employer is
required to pay monthly installments from an employee's wages into court for the benefit of
judgment creditors. Although not labeled garnishment, the effect is the same, and the proce-
dure permits execution on prospective wages. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 5231 (McKinney 1967).
25. 229 N.C. at 557, 50 S.E.2d at 671.
26. Id. The ease with which the legislature has overcome this barrier to garnishment with
the enactment of § 110-136 renders this judicial reasoning specious at best. This indicates that
there are unmentioned policy considerations behind the judicial constraint on garnishment.
27. See text accompanying notes 49-51 infra.
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This limitation has reduced wage garnishment under sections 50-13.4
and 50-16.7 to a hollow remedy. Given the nature of a continuing support
order, enforcement by means of the garnishment they provide is a
troublesome procedure at best. If prospective earnings are not subject to
garnishment, dependents have to wait during each payment interval until the
responsible parent is in arrears before bringing the garnishment action, and
then an action can be brought only against wages earned and owing to the
employee. This necessitates a series of separate garnishment orders, each of
which is time-consuming, expensive and marginally productive of support
to dependents. 28
The experience of other states and the history of the AFDC program
similarly demonstrate the inadequacy of the earlier remedies. 29 One study
conducted in 1955 revealed that absent fathers "complied with [their]
support obligations to some extent in only 18.3% of cases involving AFDC
families despite widespread civil and criminal legislation designed to en-
force [their] duty. "30 Although the inadequacy of these remedies is a major
cause of the large increase in the number of families receiving AFDC
benefits, the apathy of the courts, prosecutors and welfare officers in
administering and enforcing the laws already enacted has also contributed
significantly to their ineffectiveness.31
In response to this situation Congress enacted the Title IV D Program
in 197532 in an effort to force states to redesign and make better use of
support enforcement remedies. Under this program the states must imple-
ment a child support program conforming to federal requirements33 before
28. Although § 110-136 has alleviated this procedural problem for the dependent child, a
wife seeking alimony alone must still follow these tedious steps in order to garnish wages. See,
e.g., Watson v. Watson, 424 F. Supp. 866 (E.D.N.C. 1976). This is so, even though Congress
has permitted prospective wage garnishment of federal employees for alimony, as well as for
child support. See 42 U.S.C. § 659 (Supp. V 1975).
29. Most of the remedies discussed are employed in some manner by a majority of the
states. See generally 2 W. NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 16.03, at 387 (contempt), §
16.47, at 495 (execution), § 16.48, at 503 (attachment and garnishment), § 16.50, at 509
(receivership and injunction) (2d ed. 1961).
30. Willging & Elismore, The "Dual System" in Action: Jail For Nonsupport, 1969 U.
TOL. L. REv. 348, 373.
31. A Senate Report on the Social Services Amendments of 1974 cited a study by the Rand
Corporation that revealed that -[m]any lawyers and officials find child support cases boring,
and are actually hostile to the concept of fathers' responsibility for children." SENATE FINANCE
COMM., supra note 3, at 43, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 8147. The
study also dispelled the common belief that nonenforcement of child support was often due to
inability to find absent fathers. "[The fathers] have not disappeared. Usually they were living in
the same county as their children." Id.
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-660 (Supp. V 1975).
33. Id. § 654.
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they will become eligible to receive matching federal funds. 34 Although the
states administer their own programs, they are subject to audit by an agency
created for this purpose by the Secretary of Health, Education and Wel-
fare. 35 Congress also created an innovative remedy that eliminates the
federal immunity against suit and allows garnishment of federal employees'
wages by state courts. 36 This remedy is, however, available only in those
states that have a statute providing for wage garnishment. 37 To take advan-
tage of this elimination of governmental immunity and to remedy the
inadequacies of the garnishment procedures of sections 50-13.4 and 50-
16.7, North Carolina enacted section 110-136 providing for garnishment of
prospective wages for enforcement of child support. 38
The new North Carolina statute provides that any responsible parent
under court order or written agreement to provide child support is subject to
garnishment of up to twenty percent of his monthly disposable earnings. 39
Before a court may issue a garnishment order it must be shown that the
responsible parent has been delinquent or erratic in making child support
payments. 4 After an order is issued, the amount garnished is transmitted by
the employer to the clerk of superior court, and payments are subsequently
forwarded either directly to the party designated by the order, or, in the case
of dependent children receiving public assistance, to the North Carolina
Department of Human Resources. 41 The employer is the defendant in the
garnishment action and his noncompliance with the order is "subject to
punishment as for contempt.'"42 Although this statute was enacted to facili-
tate the collection operation of the state welfare system, it is important to
note that the remedy is available to other parties43 including the county
subrogated to the rights of the dependent pursuant to section 110-137. 44 In
34. Under the program, the federal contribution to state plans is increased from 50% to
75%. Id. § 655. States not complying with the requirements would face a penalty in the form of
reduced matching funds for AFDC payments (the Secretary could impose a penalty equal to 5%
of the federal funds for AFDC payments made by the state in the year the audit was conduct-
ed). Id. §§ 603(h), 652(a)(4).
35. Id. § 652(a)(4).
36. Id. § 659.
37. The statute provides only for consent to state garnishment proceedings. It does not set
up a federal procedure by which a garnishment proceeding may be instituted. Id.
38. Law of June 25, 1975, ch. 827, § 1, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 1166.
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-136(a) (Supp. 1975) (substantial portions of the statute are set
out in note 7 supra).
40. Id. § 110-136(b).
41. Id. § 110-136(d).
42. Id. § 110-136(e).
43. "The mother, father, custodian or guardian of the child or any county interested in the
support of a dependent child .... " Id. § 110-136(b).
44. Id. § 110-137 provides in part: "The county shall be subrogated to the right of the child
or children or the person having custody to initate a support action under this Article and to
recover any payments ordered by the court of this or any other state."
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addition, the remedy is not limited to garnishment against federal employ-
ers. State and private employers as well are technically subject to garnish-
ment proceedings for wages of employees who are delinquent in their child
support payments. 45
The most significant language in the statute is found in subsection 110-
136(c), pertaining to the form of the order: "The order shall set forth
sufficient findings of fact to support the action by the court and the amount
to be garnished for each pay period.'" 46 This language indicates that the
statute provides for a continuing arrangement whereby the employer will
deduct the ordered amount and submit it to the court each month. In the
past, in order to enforce the continuity of support payments now attainable
under this statute, it was necessary to bring a separate garnishment action
each pay period. In this respect, the statute diverges drastically from the
historical conception of and limitations on wage garnishment.47
These traditional limitations on wage garnishment are, in part, the
reason for the limited use that has been made of section 110-136. Although
the statute technically transcends the old limitations, it is probable that their
continuing influence overshadows the new provision and may have engen-
dered some reluctance on the part of the legal profession to reap for their
clients the substantial benefits available by way of prospective wage gar-
nishment for child support.
In addition, policy arguments against wage garnishment have been
made with some effect by various legal commentators .48 Wage garnishment
has an adverse effect on employer-employee relations. "The employer is the
garnishee defendant in the action and he must respond to the summons. 49 It
is his responsibility to deduct appropriate amounts from the judgment debtor
employee's salary and to forward that portion to the court. If the debt is not
satisfied by the first garnishment, a judgment creditor may institute a
succession of garnishment orders until the whole debt is paid. The result is
an increased bookkeeping expense to the employer and, unless provided for
by statute, an uncompensated one. The administrative difficulties arising
from garnishment often provoke the employer into dismissing the debtor
45. "'The garnishee is the person, firm, association, or corporation by whom the responsi-
ble parent is employed." Id. § 110-136(a).
46. Id. § 110-136(c) (emphasis added).
47. Traditionally, garnishment orders were issued only after a reduction of past due claims
to a money judgment. See W. NELSON, supra note 29, § 16.40, at 475, § 16.48, at 503. See also
text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
48. See, e.g., Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study and Recommendations,
53 CALIF. L. REV. 1214 (1965); Note, Wage Garnishment: Remedy or Revenge?, 5 LoY. CHI.
L.J. 140 (1974); Note, Wage Garnishment as a Collection Device, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 759.
49. Note, Wage Garnishment as a Collection Device, supra note 48, at 760.
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employee, 50 which, in turn, destroys the employee's ability to meet his
financial obligations, including support of his family. The ultimate result is
often that the employee is forced into bankruptcy. 5t
Federal and state exemption statutes have traditionally been another
limitation on the use of wage garnishment. 52 Protection of the family is the
main objective of the exemption statutes. North Carolina manifestly asserts
this concept in its exemption statute. Section 1-362 of the North Carolina
General Statutes provides for one hundred percent exemption of an employ-
ee's wages for the sixty days next preceding the issuance of a garnishment
order if the garnished wages would be used to support the family. 53 As
would be expected, the exemption may not be asserted against a dependent
seeking support. 54 This dichotomy further emphasizes the consideration that
the state has given not only to the maintenance of the stable family unit, but
also to the predicament of families abandoned by the supporting parent.
The policy of protection for the family argues strongly for the wider use
of garnishment in support enforcement. Ironically, it appears that the tradi-
tionally negative sentiment toward garnishment, based on its potentially
destructive impact on the family unit, has had an unjustifiably detrimental
effect on the advancement of the use of garnishment to enforce continuing
support for dependent families. This result follows despite the fact that
many arguments against wage garnishment are not applicable in the context
of using it for enforcement of support obligations.
50. Many companies have a rigid policy of dismissing the employee or threatening to do so
in the event of another garnishment. Brunn, supra note 48, at 1230.
51. Empirical studies have demonstrated that the number of bankruptcies in a state
increases proportionately with the degree to which earnings may be garnished. See id. at 1236;
Note, Wage Garnishment: Remedy or Revenge?, supra note 48, at 147-49.
52. Since 1968 federal law has required that at least 75% of weekly wages in every state
must be exempt from general wage garnishment. The Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968
provides that the maximum portion of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual that is
subject to garnishment may not exceed the lesser of: (1) 25% of his disposable earnings for that
week, or (2) the amount by which his disposable weekly income exceeds 30 times the federal
minimum hourly wage. Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1970).
Further restrictions on wage garnishments are left to the states. Every state has some sort of
exemption statute. For example, in Pennsylvania, a state in which all wages are unconditionally
exempt from general garnishment, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 886 (Purdon 1966), dual policy
considerations were attributed to such exemption provisions:
Doubtless the legislature meant it should operate as an exemption law for the benefit
of families of laborers and salaried officers, and quite likely they had in view. . . the
. . . inconvenience. . . of manufacturers and other large employers being harrassed
with attachment execution . . . complicating accounts, accumulating costs, and de-
priving them of the laborers on whom they depended, by diverting wages from the
current support of the laborer's family to the paying of former debts.
Firmstone v. Mack, 49 Pa. 387, 392-93 (1865).
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-362 (1969).
54. Id. §§ 50-13.4(f)(10), -16.7(k) (1976). The federal exemption, discussed at note 52
supra, is similarly limited. See 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(1) (1970).
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The ill effects of wage garnishment are a result of the detrimental
impact of a garnishment order on the family as a whole. When the family is
divided, however, it is only logical that a substantial portion of the responsi-
ble parent's income should go to support his dependents. 55 Garnishment, in
the form of a continuing levy each pay period, is the most efficient manner
by which this can be accomplished. Thus, the same argument that supports
prohibition of wage garnishment in other contexts supports the use of wage
garnishment as a constructive remedy for maintaining a divided family's
economic stability.
Nevertheless, the stigma on wage garnishment has apparently carried
over into the support area. However inapplicable the prohibitions against
wage garnishment may be to support enforcement, the pervasive distaste for
wage garnishment has all but suppressed the new garnishment provision for
child support in North Carolina. Although the remedy has been available in
the state for two years, it is doubtful that 'more than a few garnishment
orders have been issued against private employers. On the other hand, the
remedy has proven effective against federal employees as a consequence of
the elimination of federal immunity and an unspoken assurance that no
employee will be dismissed for having a garnishment order issued against
his federal employer.56 It is apparent that the basic barrier to the use of the
remedy against private employers is the fear of employer reprisal. The
inconvenience that employers would encounter from processing a limited
number of garnishment orders for child support would, however, be greatly
outweighed by the benefits to dependents and taxpayers, measured in
increased assurance of support and dollars saved on decreased welfare
expenditures.
Prior to the enactment of the IV D Program, several states enforced
support payments through continuing levying arrangements binding on
employers. 57 Since that enactment five additional states have enacted similar
55. It is questionable whether the 20% of a spouse's wages garnishable under § 110-136 is
substantial enough. This may be an additional factor contributing to the disuse of the statute,
despite the fact that a steady flow of income to a dependent, regardless of how small, would be
better than no income at all.
56. As of January 1, 1977, not a single garnishment order had been filed against a private
employer at the Wake County Courthouse. In contrast, approximately ten orders had been filed
against federal employers. Although not a great number, the discrepancy is revealing, and, if
the experience of one county is indicative of the state as a whole, this information reveals a
decided disuse of § 110-136. See also Watson v. Watson, 424 F. Supp. 866 (E.D.N.C. 1976).
57. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-362a (West Cum. Supp. 1976) (execution on wages for
support); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 21.1 (Smith-Hurd Cum Supp. 1977) (assignment of wages to
secure payment of child support); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 405.035 (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1976)
(assignment of wages for child support payment); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 552.203 (MIcH. STAT.
ANN. § 25.163 (Callaghan 1974)) (assignment of income, withholding from earnings to pay
support); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 21.1 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977) (assignment of wages to
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legislation.58 All of these states provide for subjection of prospective wages
to payment for child support. Though seldom labeled as garnishment ac-
tions, their effect is essentially the same as that provided under section 110-
136. The remedies commonly take one of three forms: an assignment of
wages binding on the employer;5 9 an attachment of wages (garnishment);60
or a court order requiring the employer to withhold wages for support on a
continuing basis.6 '
Many of these states have given commendable consideration to the
effect upon an employer of having his employee's wages garnished. Com-
pensation to the employer for his administrative expenses in complying with
support orders ranges from a low of fifty cents per order provided by
Kentucky 62 to five dollars per month allowed in Nebraska. 63 These amounts
are generally deducted from the amount ordered for support each pay
period. Although the amounts may appear inadequate, the expense to the
employer of making future payments under an order should be negligible
after the initial establishment of a bookkeeping procedure. These provisions
should indirectly alleviate the fear of employee discharge due to garnish-
ment orders, but further deterrents to employer reprisal are probably also
necessary. Delaware, for example, provides a stiff penalty against an em-
ployer for discharge of an employee. Dismissal of an employee due to an
attachment order is punishable by a fine of up to one thousand dollars or
ninety days in prison or both. Subsequent offenses are subject to fines of
five thousand dollars or imprisonment for one year or both. 64
If the intended benefits are to follow from section 110-136, suit against
a private employer must be made more of a practical possibility. To this
support); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364.01 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (withholding from earnings to pay
support); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 49-b (McKinney 1976) (wage assignment and deduction by
court order in support cases); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.21 (Page 1972) (withholding
personal earnings to pay support); 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2043.39(c) (Purdon 1968)
(attachment of wages for support); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 52.055(2m) (West Supp. 1977) (assign-
ment of wages binding an employer).
58. ALASKA STAT. § 47.23.070 (Cum. Supp. 1976); DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 516 (Cum. Supp.
1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.2574 (West Cum. Supp. 1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 99-915b.1 (Cum.
Supp. 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45b-13 (1977).
59. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.23.070 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
405.035 (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1976).
60. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 516 (Cum. Supp. 1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 99-915b.1
(Cum. Supp. 1977).
61. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364.01 (Cum. Supp. 1976). Georgia and Florida, two
of the states that provide for assignment of future wages, retain the traditional restriction that
only arrearages reduced to a judgment amount may be enforced under the provision. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 409.2574(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 99-915b. l(b) (Cum. Supp.
1977). Once the arrearage is paid, the assignment order will cease. In this respect the arrange-
ment is not a continuing one.
62. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.035 (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1976).
63. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364.01(3) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
64. DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 516(d) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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end, two changes should be made in the statute, for in its present state it is
doubtful that any attorney would jeopardize a responsible parent's job by
seeking to garnish his wages because of the potentially counterproductive
nature of such an action. First, provision must be made for compensation to
the employer for the increased bookkeeping expense that accompanies a
continuing garnishment order. Secondly, a severe penalty should be as-
sessed against discharging an employee because of a garnishment.6 5 Until
such action is taken, decreases in welfare expenditures and increased assur-
ance of support to dependents will never be realized, and an essential
support enforcement remedy will continue to lay dormant.
MICHAEL ANDREW HEEDY
Taxation-Part A Medicare Benefits Under
the Dependency Support Test
Section 152(a) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code' permits a taxpayer
to claim a qualified individual as a dependent if the taxpayer has provided
more than half of that individual's total support during the taxable year.2
65: In addition, although not discussed at length herein, the 20% maximum provided by §
110-136(a) should be raised to a level that will adequately reflect the economic needs of
abandoned dependents. See note 55 supra. The ceiling placed on wage garnishment by the
Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, see note 52 supra, is inapplicable to garnishment
actions for support. 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(1) (1970).
1. I.R.C. § 152(a).
2. Section 152 provides in pertinent part:
(a) GENERAL DEFINITION-For purposes of this subtitle, the term "dependent"
means any of the following individuals over half of whose support, for the calender
year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer begins, was received from the taxpayer
i4i The father or mother of the taxpayer, or an ancestor of either,
(8) A son-in-law, daughter-in-law, father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-in-law,
or sister-in-law of the taxpayer ....
Id. Treas. Reg. § 1.152-1(a)(2)(i), T.D. 6231, 1957-1 C.B. 77, 83, adds:
For purposes of determining whether or not an individual received, for a given
calendar year, over half of his support from the taxpayer, there shall be taken into
account the amount of support received from the taxpayer as compared to the entire
amount of support which the individual received from all sources, including support
which the individual himself supplied. The term "support" includes food, shelter,
clothing, medical and dental care, education, and the like.
Id. The burden of proof is on the taxpayer to establish not only the amount of his or her
contribution but also that it constitutes more than half of the individual's total support. E.g.,
Rose D. Serayder, 50 T.C. 756, 760 (1968), acq. 1969-2 C.B. xxv; Aaron F. Vance, 36 T.C. 547,
549 (1961). For discussion of dependency support, see Krawchick, Who Is Dependent? Whose
Dependent? What Is Support?, 29 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. FED. TAX. 1343 (1971); [1975] 1 TAX
COORDINATOR (RIA) A-3100 to -3120.
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Under this dependency support test, some government benefits disbursed on
behalf of the individual may raise troublesome analytical problems in
determining whether such benefits should be included in computing the total
amount of support provided the individual. Despite a Treasury regulation
that directs the inclusion of social security benefits as amounts contributed
by the recipient for his or her own support3 and the consistent treatment of
other social welfare disbursements as support, 4 clear principles for deter-
mining section 152(a) status of other government benefits have not yet
crystallized. In Turecamo v. Commissioner,5 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit confronted the question whether Medicare
hospitalization benefits paid pursuant to Part A of Subchapter XVIII of the
Social Security Act (Part A benefits)6 should be considered support provided
by the beneficiary for section 152(a) purposes. The court answered the
question by concluding that Part A benefits were excludible from dependen-
cy support computations. 7
During most of the taxable year in question (1970), the Medicare
beneficiary, Mrs. Kavanaugh, lived with the taxpayers, her son-in-law and
daughter. Mrs. Kavanaugh incurred a hospital bill that year totaling
$11,095.75. Part A Medicare allowances paid $10,434.75 of that bill. The
taxpayers paid the balance as well as other medical expenses incurred by
Mrs. Kavanaugh. In all, the taxpayers paid a total of $3,531 in medical
expenses and approximately $4000 for other support items on Mrs.
Kavanaugh's behalf.8 Mrs. Kavanaugh also received $1140 in social securi-
ty benefits, which she applied toward her own support. The taxpayers,
assuming that they had provided Mrs. Kavanaugh more than half her
3. Treas. Reg. § 1.152-1(a)(2)(ii), T.D. 6231, 1957-1 C.B. 77, 83.
4. See, e.g., Eli C. Leggett, 45 T.C.M. (P-H) 20 (1976) (state medical assistance payments
and state-federal AFDC payments); Hiram Johnson, 43 TC.M. (P-H) 619 (1974) (state welfare
payments); Glenn W. Kincheloe, 40 T.C.M. (P-H) 161 (1971) (disability payments); H.B.
House, 28 T.C.M. (P-H) 191 (1959) (maintenance in state mental hospital); John L. Donner, 25
T.C. 1043 (1956) (support of invalid child in state school); Rev. Rul. 74-543, 1974-2 C.B. 39
(social security benefit payments to the child of a disabled parent); Rev. Rul. 74-153, 1974-1
C.B. 20 (state payments to adoptive parents for necessary support of their adopted children).
5. 554 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1977). For a summary of the Second Circuit's opinion, see
Medicare "Part A " Payments Are Not Support for Purpose of Determining Dependency Deduc-
tion Taken by Recipient's Children, [1977-I] U.S. TAX WEEK (Bender) 676; Second Circuit Says
Basic Medicare Isn't Support, [1977] 48 FED. TAXES (P-H) 60,249.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c to 1395i-2 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Although Medicare is a part of
the larger social security system, benefits disbursed under Medicare should be distinguished
from "social security benefits." The latter term is popularly used to describe only benefits
disbursed under the old-age, survivors, and disability program, id. §§ 401-432. See COMMERCE
CLEARING HOUSE, MEDICARE AND SOCIAL SECURITY EXPLAINED 15 (1976).
7. 554 F.2d at 566.
8. Id. at 567.
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support during the taxable year, 9 claimed an additional dependency exemp-
tion10 and included the amount they spent paying Mrs. Kavanaugh's medical
bills as part of their own deductible medical expenses. 1I
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled, however, that the Part A
benefits paid on Mrs. Kavanaugh's behalf had to be included as part of her
contribution to her own support. 12 In so ruling, the Commissioner relied on
a previous revenue ruling 13 that prescribed this treatment of Part A benefits
in accordance with traditional section 152(a) treatment of social insurance
and welfare disbursements. 14 As a result of the Commissioner's ruling, the
taxpayers failed to establish that they had provided more than half of Mrs.
Kavanaugh's support for the taxable year. 15 Hence, their additional personal
exemption and medical expense deduction were denied and a tax deficiency
was assessed. The Tax Court subsequently overruled the Commissioner
with regard to section 152(a) treatment of the Part A benefits and allowed
the taxpayers' dependency claims. 16
In affirming the Tax Court's decision, the Second Circuit based its
holding on two independent grounds. - First, the court found that Part A
benefits were indistinguishable for section 152(a) purposes from sums
disbursed under both Part B Medicare insurance 17 and private health insur-
ance, which have been held excludible from dependency support computa-
tions. 18 On this basis, it determined that Part A benefits should not be treated
differently from proceeds paid under these other insurance plans. Second,
the court concluded that the Part A benefits had no "economic impact" on
Mrs. Kavanaugh's financial relationship with the taxpayers. 19 In other
words, the court stated, receipt of the Medicare benefits did not alter the
established economic relationship between Mrs. Kavanaugh and the taxpay-
9. Including the $10,434.75 in Part A benefits as support, the taxpayers would.have
provided only $7,531, approximately 40% of $19,105.75 spent in total support payments for
Mrs. Kavanaugh. Disregarding those benefits for § 152(a) purposes, Mrs. Kavanaugh's total
support payments amounted to only $8,671, and the taxpayers' contribution constituted well
over half of that total. Id.
10. I.R.C. § 151(e) allows the taxpayer to take additional personal exemptions as deduc-
tions for qualified dependents.
11. 554 F.2d at 567. I.R.C. § 213(a) permits the taxpayer to include the medical expenses
of qualified dependents in medical deduction computations.
12. 554 F.2d at 567.
13. Rev. Rul. 70-341, 1970-2 C.B. 31.
14. The Commissioner, holding that Part A Medicare benefits should be treated as support
under this broad social welfare rubric, stated that they were "in the nature of disbursements
made in furtherance of the social welfare objectives of the Federal government" and were "not
legally distinguishable" from monthly social security payments. Id.
15. See note 9 supra.
16. Turecamo v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 720 (1975).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395j-1395w (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
18. See text accompanying notes 39-41 infra.
19. 554 F.2d at 568.
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ers, who regularly paid the bulk of her normal living expenses as well as
medical expenses that she herself would otherwise have had to pay. 20
Full comprehension of Turecamo and its significance requires a funda-
mental understanding of the Medicare system. 2' Created in 1965,22 Medi-
care was instituted to provide a comprehensive approach to health insurance
for the aged. 23 It has been asserted that the two substantive parts of the
Medicare statutory scheme, Parts A and B, provide more comprehensive
and complex coverage than many of the medical insurance plans underwrit-
ten by private insurers.24 Part A furnishes basic hospitalization insurance to
all persons entitled to payments either under federal old-age, survivors, and
disability insurance or under the railroad retirement system325 This service is
paid for from a trust fund that is financed by a compulsory payroll tax on
employees' wages, by an employers excise tax, and by a tax on earnings of
self-employers. 26 This financing method is calculated to make the trust fund
actuarially sound and self-supporting.27 Part B28 of the Medicare system
provides supplementary health services, including payment for physicians'
care. 29 Part B coverage is available to persons eligible to participate in the
Part A program and to other qualified United States residents aged sixty-five
or older.30 The Part B program is financed by monthly premiums paid by the
participants l and by matching government contributions from the general
revenues. 32 These sums are deposited into a separate trust fund. 3
Thus, both substantive parts of the Medicare system constitute hybrid
forms of insurance. For instance, the Part A provisions contain elements of
private health insurance-periodic payments for specified protection against
20. Id. at 576.
21. For discussion of Medicare, see COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, supra note 6, at 189-
393; R. STEVENS & R. STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA 48-51 (1974).
22. Health Insurance for the Aged Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965)
(presently codified as amended in scattered sections of 9, 42 U.S.C.).
23. 554 F.2d at 571 (citing H.R. REP. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965)).
24. See R. BLAIR & R. VOGEL, THE COST OF HEALTH INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION 82
(1975).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (Supp. V 1975). Qualified individuals who are otherwise ineligible
for Part A coverage may enroll in the program by paying monthly premiums. Id. § 1395i-2
(Supp. V 1975).
26. Id. § 1395i (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
27. 554 F.2d at 571 (citing S. REP. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 179 (1972); S. REP. No.
404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 55-57 (1965); H.R. REP. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 47-49 (1965)).
ment. Id. at 77-80. But there are varying degrees of "publicness." Id. at 86. For instance, the
28. 42 U.S.C.A.-§§1395j-1395w (West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1395k (1970 & Cum. Supp. 1975).
30. Id. § 1395o (Supp. V 1975). The other qualified United States residents aged 65 or
older who are eligible for Part A coverage include United States citizens and aliens lawfully
admitted for permanent residence who have resided in the United States for the 5 years
immediately preceding the month in which application for Part A enrollment has been made. Id.
§ 1395o(2).
31. Id. § 1395r (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
32. Id. § 1395w.
33. Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund. Id. § 1395t.
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risk of loss due to illness, the spreading of payments over time and over a
pool of participants, and the actuarially calculated self-supporting character
of the disbursing fund.34 On the other hand, the Part A provisions also
contain elements common to social insurance or welfare-compulsory
financing through designated taxes, 35 the non-deductibility of those taxes, 36
and government sponsorship.37 For dependency support test purposes, this
mixed composition of the Part A program makes two different lines of
authority relevant, one dealing with proceeds disbursed under insurance
plans and the other with social insurance or welfare receipts.
As a general rule, sums spent to defray medical expenses are con-
sidered part of an individual's support.38 However, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in Mawhinney v. Commissioner39 that
insurance premiums, rather than the proceeds paid under a private health
insurance policy, should be included in dependency support computations as
the cost of medical support. The Commissioner has formally adopted this
approach toward premiums and proceeds under private health insurance
plans. 4' Furthermore, the Commissioner has ruled that the voluntary pre-
miums Medicare participants pay for Part B coverage, rather than the
benefits disbursed under that program, should be included as support be-
cause Part B premiums "qualify as amounts paid for insurance covering
medical care." 41
34. 554 F.2d at 575. Part B contains similar elements. See text accompanying notes 28-33
supra.
35. The Commissioner argued in Turecamo that for § 152(a) purposes the compulsory
participation aspect of Part A made the program distinguishable from Part B, to which partici-
pants pay voluntary premiums as in private insurance plans. 554 F.2d at 572. The Commissioner
reasoned that Part A benefits should be treated as other social insurance or welfare receipts
rather than as insurance proceeds under § 152(a). Id. See generally authorities cited note 4
supra. The Second Circuit, however, relying on Congressional debates and pertinent commen-
tary, stated that this compulsory-voluntary dichotomy does not conclusively determine the
dependency support test consequences of Part A benefits. 554 F.2d at 572-73. The court found
that the different funding methods reflected, among other things, Congress' "desire to guaran-
tee the participation of those citizens sought to be protected and. . . recognition of the relative
ease of actuarially projecting hospital costs as compared to physicians' costs." Id. at 573
(footnotes omitted). The court also found that the unavailability of insurance coverage compa-
rable to Part B at competitive prices "practically compelled" eligible individuals to participate
in that government program. Id. at 574.
36. The Second Circuit found that the non-deductibility of the Medicare payroll tax, in
contrast to the I.R.C. § 213(e)(1)(C) deductibility of Part B premiums, was "without decisive
significance." 554 F.2d at 573 n.18. "'There is no necessary correlation between section 213
and sections 151 and 152.'" Id. (quoting Turecamo v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. at 728).
37. Id. at 575.
38. See Treas. Reg. § 1.152-1(a)(2)(i), T.D. 6231, 1957-1 C.B. 77, 83.
39. 355 F.2d 462 (3d Cir. 1966), aff'g per curiam 43 T.C. 443 (1965). But cf. Samples v.
United States, 226 F. Supp. 115 (N.D. Ga. 1963) (proceeds under group insurance plan
purchased by employer of beneficiary constitute support).
40. Rev. Rul. 64-223, 1964-2 C.B. 50.
41. Rev. Rul. 70-341, 1970-2 C.B. 31. This was the same ruling in which the Commissioner
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The implicit rationale of these authorities, recognized by the Second
Circuit, is that a "planned and rational relationship" between an individual
and the taxpayer who regularly contributes to that individual's support will
include the routine cost of maintaining medical insurance as the budgeted
support cost for medical expenses. 42 Moreover, the court observed that the
average person considers " 'insurance premiums plus unreimbursed pay-
ments for health care' " as his or her health costs. 43 Under this analysis,
treating large insurance payments as support distorts "economic reali-
ties."'
Social insurance or welfare disbursements, on the other hand, have
traditionally been treated as support under section 152(a).45 For example, in
Lutter v. Commissioner46 the Tax Court held that state medical assistance
grants and government payments to indigent parents with dependent chil-
dren constituted support provided by the state. Similarly, the cost of care in
a state mental institution has been treated as support. 47 The Commissioner
has also ruled that the amount received by a child under social security
survivors insurance was the beneficiary's contribution to support.48
It appears that the policy behind this approach to social insurance and
welfare disbursements under the dependency support test has never been
articulated by the courts or by the Commissioner. Indeed, treatment of
government largesse as support has sometimes been an automatic reflex. 49
Nevertheless, the common denominator among these cases and rulings
provides an analytical key. The disbursements involved constitute public
held that Part A-benefits should be included in dependency support computations. See note 14
supra.
42. 554 F.2d at 576.
43. Id. (quoting Turecamo v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. at 730 n. I (Wilbur, J., concurring)).
In Rev. Rul. 64-223, 1964-2 C.B. 50, the Commissioner stated:
Where the taxpayer or the individual is covered under a renewable term policy
which provides insurance against the cost of medical care. . . ,the policyholder will
be considered as having furnished the care since the policyholder, under a privately
financed medical insurance plan, is regarded as providing medical care for himself and
the other beneficiaries of the policy.
Id.
44. 554 F.2d at 576.
45. See authorities cited note 4 supra.
46. 61 T.C. 685 (1974), aff'd per curiam, 514 F.2d 1095 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
931 (1975).
47. Julia Pugisson, 27 T.C.M. (P-H) 896 (1958).
48. Rev. Rul. 57-344, 1957-2 C.B. 112. Attributing the contribution to the beneficiary is a
fiction that has been used when the payments have accrued to the beneficiary on account of
specific taxes, such as a social security payroll tax, paid by the beneficiary or on his or her
behalf. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-543, 1974-2 C.B. 39 (social security benefit payments to child of
disabled parent held child's contribution to his own support).
49. See, e.g., Roy B. Abbott, 23 T.C.M. (P-H) 171 (1954) (court included value of X-rays
and medical examinations furnished free by public health authorities and value of milk furnish-
ed by township in support computations).
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goods satisfying certain social wants.5" More specifically, the cases and
rulings all indirectly involve situations in which society, through the agency
of government, has provided special goods and services to certain members
of society-for example, the mentally ill51 and children of disabled par-
ents52-- whose needs have been inadequately served by the private sector.
The intended beneficiaries have commonly received assistance in the form
of items listed in the Treasury regulations as support.53 Concomitantly, the
financial burdens of taxpayers with a legal obligation or a self-perceived
moral obligation to support these beneficiaries have been eased. Recogni-
tion of these facts by the courts and the Commissioner may explain the
traditional section 152(a) approach to government benefits, a tack that is
decidedly unfavorable to the taxpayer who indirectly benefits from govern-
ment disbursements and then subsequently attempts to deduct dependency
claims.
Despite the Part A program's similarities to private insurance,' this
component of the Medicare system is a public good. Medicare was created
because private enterprise had failed to provide adequate health insurance
for the elderly.55 Contributions have in fact been made by the beneficiaries
themselves or on their behalf through the payroll tax, but the Part A
insurance pool is also funded through such other sources as the employers
50. A public good is one whose production has external or spill-over effects. D. HYMAN,
THE ECONOMICS OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTIvrrY 73-74 (1973). In other words, public goods are
goods that, if produced for any one member of society, yield benefits to other members of
society. A pure public good is collectively consumed by all members of society, none of whom
can be prevented from taking advantage of, or otherwise benefiting from, the particular service
provided. Each member's consumption of such a good does not reduce the consumption
available to other members. Id. at 74. National defense is an example of a pure public good.
Efficient production of pure public goods usually requires collective action through the govern-
ment. Id. at 77-80. But there are varying degrees of "publicness." Id. at 86. For instance, the
quantity of a certain good may be limited, but its consumption by some members may satisfy
wants of others who do not participate in consumption. See id. at 86. The provision of food and
housing to the poor by private charity may satisfy the social wants of other members of society
who desire that no one lack the necessities of life. A governmentally provided health service
constitutes another such "quasi-public good." Id. The government may or may not produce
any given quasi-public good, depending on how satisfactorily the private sector produces that
good. See id. at 85-90. For the purposes of this Note, the distinction between public goods and
quasi-public goods is needlessly technical. Use of the term "public good" herein will refer to
any good that the government provides whenever the private sector is incapable of producing it
or when the private sector provides it in a manner that is deemed unsatisfactory. See generally
A. PAPANDREOU, PATERNALISTIC CAPITALISM 31-32 (1972).
Public goods are most commonly financed through taxation. T. SCITOVSKY, WELFARE AND
COMPETITION 261 (rev. ed. 1971).
51. See, e.g., Julia Pugisson, 27 T.C.M. (P-H) 896 (1958).
52. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-543, 1974-2 C.B. 39.
53. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.152-I(a)(2)(i), T.D. 6231, 1957-1 C.B. 77, 83, with Roy B.
Abbott, 23 T.C.M. (P-H) 171 (1954).
54. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
55. R. STEVENS & R. STEVENS, supra note 21, at 50.
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excise tax. 56 Thus, the cost of Part A coverage is probably borne by a larger
segment of society than directly benefits under the program.5 7 This aspect of
Part A makes the program distinguishable from private health insurance
plans in which premiums paid by participants constitute a truly self-suffi-
cient pool. Under these plans, individuals who pay premiums provide
adequate funds collectively to enable underwriters to defray covered medi-
cal support expenses of the beneficiaries. 58
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit in Turecamo focused on the Part A
program's similarities to private insurance, especially the regular payments
for financial protection against risk of loss. 59 In concluding that Part A
benefits, like private health insurance proceeds, were excludible from sec-
tion 152(a) computations, the Second Circuit attempted to answer a question
that had been left open by the Tax Court. The Tax Court had held that there
was no proper basis for distinguishing Part A benefits from payments under
private health insurance plans and under the Part B Medicare program. But
it explicitly left open the question whether all such payments should be
included as part of an individual's support under section 152(a). This
question accentuated the weakness of the line of authority holding that
health insurance proceeds are excludible from dependency support computa-
tions and suggested the conceivability of the Commissioner's reversing
himself with regard to section 152(a) treatment of Part B benefits and private
health insurance proceeds. 61
The first rationale provided by the Second Circuit went no further than
the Tax Court. It merely echoed the lower court's conclusion that the
56. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
57. It is at least theoretically possible, however, that the incidence of the employers tax is
shifted to labor through the employers' reduction of wages in response to the tax. J. PECHMAN,
FEDERAL TAX POLICY 210-11 (3d ed. 1977). The economic model on which theories of this sort
are based, however, assumes rational behavior in labor markets and disregards the effect of
collective bargaining on wages. Id. at 211. The tax is so general and so many other factors are
involved that it is impossible to prove conclusively that the incidence of the employers tax rests
solely on labor. J. WINFREY, PUBLIC FINANCE: PUBLIC CHOICES AND THE PUBLIC ECONOMY 447
(1973). In reality, it is also possible that all or part of both the employers and payroll taxes is
shifted to consumers. J. PECHMAN, supra at 211. Labor unions resist wage cuts and may
succeed in persuading management to raise prices and wages by amounts sufficient to offset the
taxes. Id.
58. Part B of the Medicare system, like Part A, also differs from private health insurance
plans. Part B is a public good financed to a great extent with public funds. See text accompany-
ing notes 31-32 supra. For instance, in 1976, 58.8% of Part B Medicare funds came from the
general revenues. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF H.E.W., 40 Soc. SECURI-
TY BULL., No. 4, 14 (1977). Thus, the premiums paid by Part B participants by no means
provide a self-sufficient insurance pool to pay for covered medical expenses.
59. 554 F.2d at 575.
60. 64 T.C. at 728.
61. See [1975] TAX COORDINATOR (RIA) A-3108.6.
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various payments were legally indistinguishable.62 In explaining its second
ground, however, the court answered to its own satisfaction the question left
open by the Tax Court. Relying in part on a footnote in a concurring opinion
to the Tax Court's decision,63 the Second Circuit determined that receipt of
payments under the Part A plan "interrupts but does not alter" the estab-
lished financial relationship. between an individual and the taxpayer who
pays most of that individual's other expenses.64 The court recognized "that
certain providers of hospital services received more in Medicare payments
from the Federal government . . . than Mrs. Kavanaugh received in sup-
port from the Turecamos," but it stated that this fact did not change the
"basic financial relationship" between the taxpayers and the beneficiary. 65
On this basis, the court concluded that all health insurance proceeds, Part A
benefits included, should be disregarded in dependency support computa-
tions.66 Thus, if only by way of dictum, Turecamo adds further legitimacy
to the authorities holding that disbursements under health insurance plans do
not constitute support for section 152(a) purposes. 67
As a matter of tax symmetry, it is at least arguable that the result in
Turecamo is a good one. As oveiiapping components of a closely coor-
dinated system, the two Medicare programs, Parts A and B, are nearly
indistinguishable in light of economic principles.68 As the Commissioner
has decided that benefits under Part B, like proceeds disbursed under private
health plans, should not be treated as support, it might be argued that Part A
benefits should be dealt with similarly. The Second Circuit, following a
similar line of reasoning, marked the Commissioner's concession that Part B
benefits were excludible from dependency support computations69 and em-
phasized the virtual indistinguishability of the two programs. 70
Regardless of this concession, 7' the similarities between Parts A and B,
62. Compare 554 F.2d at 568-75 with 64 T.C. at 722-29.
63. See 554 F.2d at 576 (quoting 64 T.C. at 730 n. 1 (Wilbur, J., concurring)).
64. id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 568, 576.
67. For a discussion of these authorities, see text accompanying notes 39-41 supra.
68. See note 58 and text accompanying notes 54-58 supra.
69. 554 F.2d at 568.
70. See id. at 572-74.
71. The Commissioner's concession on the treatment of Part B benefits, regardless of its
merits, did not amount to a constraint on the judicial decision in Turecamo. See 64T.C. at 739-
40 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting). The precise issue in this case involved only the § 152(a)
treatment of Part A benefits. See id. at 740. Moreover, the concession came in the form of a
revenue ruling. A revenue ruling issued to a taxpayer on the tax consequences of a particular
transaction yields a holding with respect to that transaction only. IRS Statement of Procedural
Rules, 26 C.F.R. § 601.201(1)(6) (1977). Revenue rulings are revocable and cannot be asserted
to estop the Internal Revenue Service in subsequent cases. See id. § 601.201(1)(1). Hence, the
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and the similarities between these Medicare programs and private health
insurance,72 Part A benefits do not have to be treated as payments under
private health insurance plans in the dependency support context. The Part
A program certainly involves regular payments by the participants for
specified protection against risk of loss, a "classic characteristic of insur-
ance," 73 but the reasons for treating Part A benefits in accordance with
traditional section 152(a) treatment of social insurance or welfare disburse-
ments seem far more compelling. Part A insurance is different from private
health insurance in one respect that is crucial for section 152(a) purposes:
participants in the Part A program do not themselves provide adequate
support through the amounts paid under the employees payroll tax, their
"premiums," to defray the cost of covered medical expenses. 74 The govern-
ment in its role as underwriter provides additional financing through taxes
on nonparticipants. 75 This classic characteristic of social insurance or wel-
fare is an aspect of Part A that the Second Circuit failed to deal with in
Turecamo beyond the simple recognition that the levies on nonparticipants
are sources of revenue for the Part'A program's trust fund.76 The strong
economic bond between Part A and other, government programs, the bene-
fits of which have been treated as support, should be the determinative
factor with regard to section 152(a) treatment of Part A benefits. 77
Finally, the Second Circuit's assertion that Part A benefits do not alter
an individual's financial dependency on a taxpayer 78 is perplexing. Medi-
Commissioner's ruling on the § 152(a) treatment of Part B benefits has dubious significance in a
subsequent case involving Part A benefits alone.
72. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
73. 554 F.2d at 575. The Second Circuit found this feature of Part A to be the "most
significant in determining the section 152(a) support test consequences" of benefits disbursed
under this program. Id.
74. See text accompanying notes 56-58 supra.
75. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
76. The court did, however, distinguish between Part A and social insurance or welfare on
the basis of the former's exclusive availability to defray the cost of specified medical expenses.
See 554 F.2d at 575. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit pointed out
in Lutter v. Commissioner, 514 F.2d 1095, 1096 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 931 (1975),
however, certain state-federal welfare payments to indigent parents are exclusively applicable
to uses in the best interests of the recipients' dependent children. Even if the Second Circuit's
distinction had been valid, it would not undermine the crucial economic bases for classifying
the Part A program as social insurance or welfare. See text accompanying notes 55-58, 74-75
supra.
77. The foregoing analysis is not intended to imply that the value of supportive benefits
derived from all public goods must be included in dependency support computations. For
example, exclusion of the value of public education might be justified because of uncertainties
with regard to valuation, even though education is included as a support item under Treas. Reg.
§ 1. 152-l(a)(2)(i), T.D. 6231, 1957-1 C.B. 77, 83. The cash value of Part A benefits, on the other
hand, is easily ascertainable as is the value of social security benefits and welfare disburse-
ments.
78. See 544 F.2d at 576.
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care reduces an individual's dependency with regard to medical expenses in
much the same way that social security benefits reduce dependency for other
support expenses. It effectively eliminates not only substantial expenses that
the taxpayer might otherwise have to pay but also the need to procure private
health insurance for the Medicare beneficiary. The taxpayer may still pay
the bulk of the Medicare beneficiary's remaining expenses, but the taxpay-
er's total responsibility to that person seems unquestionably to be diminish-
ed in proportion to the Medicare coverage provided by the government.
The Turecamo decision may be explained as a function of both the Part
A program's similarity to private health insurance and the Commissioner's
concession with regard to section 152(a) treatment of Part B benefits. If
viewed as having such a limited holding, Turecamo will have little or no
impact on treatment of other government disbursements under the depen-
denLy support test.79 However, by allowing exclusion of supportive govern-
ment benefits with easily ascertainable cash value,80 the Second Circuit has
hindered development of coherent guidelines for determining the section
152(a) status of benefits disbursed-, under government programs. 81 The
court's fixation on superficial "economic realities" 82 diverts attention away
from sound economic principles. It is thus conceivable that Turecamo could
contribute to other deviations from traditional section 152(a) treatment of
government benefits.
WILLIAM JOSEPH AuSTIN, JR.
79. This case's significance may be limited even more severely. Although the Internal
Revenue Service may voluntarily decide to comply with Turecamo in its future treatment of
Part A benefits, this case does not invalidate the revenue ruling that these government disburse-
ments constitute support. See J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 15-16 (2d ed. 1973). The
Second Circuit's holding in Turecamo merely binds the Service with respect to § 152(a)
treatment of the Part A benefits in that case. See id. Because the Service must administer the
federal income tax uniformly throughout the nation, it adheres to the view that it is bound only
by Supreme Court decisions as a matter of precedent. Id. at 16. Thus, the Revenue Service may
continue to litigate this issue.
80. See note 77 supra.
81. The Commissioner is equally blameworthy in this respect due to the decision that Part
A and Part B benefits were to be treated differently under the dependency support test. See
generally Rev. Rul. 70-341, 1970-2 C.B. 31. These two components of the Medicare system are
nearly indistinguishable. See note 58 and text accompanying notes 54-58 supra. This close
similarity dictates similar § 152(a) treatment of benefits disbursed under the two programs.
82. See 554 F.2d at 576.
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